

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND
PRIVACY ACTS**

**SUBJECT: (COINTELPRO)
ESPIONAGE PROGRAMS**

65-69260

SECTIONS 11-17



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

NOTICE

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FBI

Date: 8/21/64

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Priority)

Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-104-26)

FROM: SAC, WFO (66-2479 Sub J)

[REDACTED]

ReLAairtel to Bureau, 8/6/64.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In the event subsequent requests are received and acted upon favorably by the Department of State, the Bureau and Los Angeles Division will be notified and appropriate recommendations made.

- ③ - Bureau
- 2 - Los Angeles (105-54554) (RM) (AMSD)
- 1 - New York (100-129802) (Info) (RM)
- 1 - WFO

WRS:jld
(7)

Classified by 66-2479-3
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF THIS DOCUMENT

56 AUG 31 1964

Approved: 157 Special Agent in Charge

Sent

EX 110

14 AUG 25 1964

Per

CLASSIFIED BY 2011
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION 12-4-74
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY II
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON

65-69260-X3
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WFO 66-2479 Sub J

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

For the information of the Bureau and Los Angeles the Soviet Union and the U. S. are presently engaged in some political maneuvers with respect to travel approval on the part of official personnel in both countries and at this time it appears that no travel will be authorized at the U. S. Department of State until sometime after 8/30/64.

(U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65-69260-1

July 15, 1964

Airtel

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S)
DATE

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
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SLIP(S)

To: SACS, New York (100-129802) PERSONAL ATTENTION
Chicago (100-32862)
Washington Field (100-421FF) (Enc - 2)

From: Director, FBI (100-3-104-Main) 1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Smith (R.W.)
1 - Mr. Ryan

Since initiated in 1956, the Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro), directed against the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and related organizations, through a variety of techniques has disrupted, exposed and neutralized the communists. Some successful Cointelpro operations such as anonymous letters and mailings, in spite of their simplicity, have caused unexpected consternation and disruption among the comrades. Cointelpro-initiated publicity has been a tremendous deterrent to the comrades, while at the same time it has alerted the general public to their insidious maneuvers. More sophisticated techniques and operations have caused defections and expulsions within Party ranks.

- 1 - Boston (100-31648)
- 1 - Buffalo (100-4379-104)
- 1 - Cleveland (100-23089)
- 1 - Detroit (134-706)
- 1 - Los Angeles (100-54554)
- 1 - Milwaukee (100-42-JJ)
- 1 - Minneapolis (100-1878-FFF)
- 1 - New Haven (100-16559)
- 1 - Newark (100-42359)
- 1 - Philadelphia (100-42492)
- 1 - Pittsburgh (100-13274)
- 1 - St. Louis (100-16708)
- 1 - San Francisco (100-42399)
- 1 - Seattle (100-23650)

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY II
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MAILED 22
JUL 15 1964

Tolson
Belmont
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DR: Bgo
(28)

JUL 23 1964

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

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Date of Declassification Indefinite

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JUL 15 12 09 PM '64

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (134-3-104-26)

DATE: 10/26/64

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-129802)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY SLIP(S)
DATE 3/14/77

For the purpose of implementing captioned program the following suggestions are set forth for the Bureau's consideration and authorization:

During the week of October 12-16, 1964, momentous changes occurred in the leadership of the government and Communist Party (CP) of the USSR. The summary dismissal of N.S. KHRUSHCHEV as Premier of the USSR and Secretary of the CP of the USSR, will undoubtedly create upheaval, confusion and suspicion in the Soviet hierarchy. In addition, because of the somewhat more liberal policies of KHRUSHCHEV, as opposed to his predecessor, JOSEPH STALIN, it could be presumed that the Soviet populace may be concerned and anxious lest the new government return to the autocratic methods of its former ruler. It could be assumed that any misgivings and distastes which the Soviet people felt concerning the dismissal of KHRUSHCHEV will be felt also among the Soviet diplomatic colony in NYC, as well as in Washington, D.C.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- (3) Bureau (RM)
 - (1 - 65-62969)
- 1 - Chicago (100-32864) (Info) (RM)
- 1 - WFO (100-421FF) (Info) (RM)
- 2 - New York
 - (1 - 65-14635 Sub W)

HAB:emv
(7)

Classified by 656
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC-66 65-69260-1X14

16 OCT 28 1964

3/14/77
Classified by 3828
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Classified by 6080
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

100-129802-119
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(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED] has recently received literature from the American-Hungarian Reformed Ministerial Association, Eastern District, 963 Laurel Ave., Bridgeport, Conn., signed by Dr. STEPHEN M. BOSZORMENYI-BESSEMER. This includes data obtained by ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Senator from Connecticut, which he obtained from the U. S. Department of State. This included a summary of information concerning the situation in Transylvania and notes the following:

There are certain background aspects of the situation in Rumania which indicate a trend towards moderation in Rumanian internal policies. On June 16, (1964) the Rumanian Government announced that it had already released between nine and ten thousand political prisoners and other amnesties now in preparation would clear the jails of practically all prisoners by August 23, 1964, the Rumanian national holiday. The State Department expressed the conclusion that there was no reason to believe

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that persons of Hungarian ethnic origin have been or will be excluded from these amnesty actions.

The Rumanian Government has continued to pursue a cautious but systematic policy of Romanizing the Hungarians of Transylvania by requiring them to learn the Rumanian language, by gradually reducing the number of Hungarian-language cultural institutions in Transylvania, by intermixing Rumanians with Hungarians in positions of authority and by assigning Hungarian intellectuals to posts outside of Transylvania. Although the Rumanian Government's goal is to solve its Hungarian minority problem by reducing, rather than maintaining or expanding autonomous Hungarian institutions, it is constrained from imposing this policy in a violent fashion by several factors, notably the latent opposition of the Hungarian minority and the continued interest in the fate of that minority on the part of Hungary, to which Rumania is allied within the Soviet-bloc. Western observers who have traveled in Transylvania report that an education in the Hungarian-language elementary and secondary schools is still possible, but it is becoming increasingly difficult if not impossible to attend higher education institutions or to set out on a career without knowing the Rumanian language. Assignment of jobs to university graduates on a nationwide basis without regard to the desire of the individual also scatters Hungarian intellectuals throughout the country and also is a means of expanding Rumanian influence in the Hungarian (Transylvanian) region. The institution of a permanent Rumanian theatre as well as changing a medical institute from Hungarian to Rumanian was also noted in that region. However, other aspects of Hungarian separateness are still respected by the Rumanian Government, notably the provision for newspapers and other literature in the Hungarian language, as well as the toleration of various churches in Transylvania as long as they keep out of politics. Some travel to Hungary on the part of Transylvanian Hungarians has also been permitted with a 3-to 4 week waiting period. This appears to represent a measure of relaxation in a matter which has been a source of much resentment and ill feeling on the part of the Hungarian minority. The conclusion was that the Rumanian Government has been following a course aimed at reducing Hungarian cultural and nationalistic influence in the Transylvania region and assimilating Hungarians into the Rumanian population and reorienting the loyalties of ethnic Hungarians in Rumania toward the Rumanian state.

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The approach of the Rumanian Government in this extremely sensitive problem has in general been gradual and cautious, and the State Department found no evidence which would support allegations of genocide or of wholesale persecution toward the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. No formal diplomatic action on the matter appeared to be warranted by the State Department. (U)

[REDACTED] a source of information, advised on [REDACTED] that the Transylvanian question arose at a meeting of the Hungarian Reformed Ministerial Association held during the summer of 1964 at Ligonier, Penn., and that further inquiry into the matter was assigned to the aforementioned Dr. STEPHEN M. BOSZORMENYI-BESSEMER, chairman of the Eastern District. (U)

The following additional information was obtained from [REDACTED] (U)

[REDACTED] (U)

The Hungarian-Transylvanian Society formerly was located in Cleveland, Ohio, but is now located in Detroit, Michigan, and may have an interest in and be active in supporting freedom for the Hungarians in Transylvania. (U)

An Independence Committee for Transylvania exists in Cleveland, Ohio. [REDACTED] (U)

[REDACTED] (U)

[REDACTED] (U)

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[REDACTED] New York, N.Y., has been active in demonstrations in that area concerning the question of Hungarians in Transylvania. (U)

[REDACTED] expressed the opinion that there are countless Hungarians in the U. S. interested in the oppressed minority in Rumania and who feel that Transylvania rightfully belongs to Hungary. (U)

In order to ascertain the degree of activity in the U.S. on the part of Hungarians concerning the Transylvanian problem, it is suggested the following offices be directed by the Bureau to conduct interviews with individuals to determine the feeling of the particular individual concerning the Transylvanian question, the degree of activity in that area as well as nationwide on the same question, and the existence of any organizations which may be active in this same matter. No information concerning the Bureau's plans to utilize any individuals or organizations in COINTELPRO would be revealed to any individual without prior direction from the Bureau. (U)

NEW HAVEN DIVISION - [REDACTED] (U)

NEW YORK DIVISION [REDACTED] (U)

NEWARK DIVISION - [REDACTED] (U)

CLEVELAND DIVISION [REDACTED] (U)

Obtain information concerning Independence Committee for Transylvania and the Hungarian-Transylvanian Society. (U)

DETROIT DIVISION - Ascertain information concerning Hungarian-Transylvanian Society. (U)

TAMPA DIVISION - [REDACTED] (U)

Copies are furnished Chicago, Pittsburgh and Miami in view of their being centers of population for immigrants from Eastern European countries. (U)

~~SECRET~~

TRANSYLVANIA TRANSFIXED

- A memorandum on the plight of the Hungarian minority in Rumania, -

The western part of Rumania, the region known as Transylvania, is an area where several nationalities, each with its distinct language and culture, live together. The population of 6,200,000 is divided into 4,000,000 Rumanians, 1,600,000 Hungarians, and 400,000 Germans settled in homogeneous blocks within which the language of the local minority has been used for many centuries as a matter of course. The Hungarian population, which makes up 26 percent of all Transylvanians, has lived there since the 10th century, well before the Rumanians began to settle in that area, and has developed very distinct historical and cultural traditions rooted in its language.

When Transylvania became part of Rumania, the Rumanian government pledged to respect the rights to ethnic identity by all minorities. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 between the Allied Powers and Rumania explicitly states (Part II, Section 1, Paragraph 3) that all persons, without regard to language or faith, are entitled to all human rights and basic freedoms. Furthermore, Rumania undertook the obligation not to discriminate among its citizens according to language, even if discrimination is based ostensibly on other factors such as property, social status, political and civil activities.

These obligations were reaffirmed in the Rumanian Constitution of 1952 that created the Magyar Autonomous Region in the eastern part of Transylvania, heavily populated by Hungarians. Section 82 affirms that all minorities can use their language freely and have education at all levels in their mother tongue; it states explicitly that in each area the official language, including the language of jurisdiction, must be the one most widely spoken. In Section 17, the constitution guarantees the rights of the ethnic minorities and the protection of their culture.

These promises have not been respected by the Rumanian government. All oppressive measures practiced by communist regimes in general are particularly enforced against minorities, especially against the Hungarians. It is an undeniable fact that these are aimed at the forcible assimilation of the Hungarian ethnic group into the Rumanian nation. The steps taken in this direction indicate that this purpose is pursued by dire discrimination on the basis of language and cultural heritage. The apparent intention is to exclude all Hungarians who do not declare themselves Rumanians from education, economy, culture, and political activity.

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Administrative Measures

In 1960 the borders of the Magyar Autonomous Region were redrawn with the purpose to reduce the majority of Hungarians within this region from 79 to 64 percent, and at the same time the area was renamed Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region. The policy of industrialization was planned so as to facilitate the influx of Rumanians from outside Transylvania to formerly pure Hungarian areas in central and eastern Transylvania. While they brought in Rumanian workers from the outside, the authorities went far to exclude the indigenous Hungarians from employment in the new industrial enterprises by not granting them permission to reside in the cities. More and more Hungarians are forced to work in the Bucharest and Ploesti areas where their assimilation seems less difficult for the government.

Political Prisoners

Thousands of Hungarians are today still suffering in Rumanian prisons. A number of these people - primarily intellectuals, clergymen and other persons of high esteem, considered to be potential leaders of the Hungarians within their communities - had been sentenced during the Stalin era. Scores of new convictions were made following the Hungarian uprising of 1956. At this time, large numbers of Hungarians, many of them young people still in their teens, were rounded up and imprisoned by the Rumanian government, for having "sympathized" with the revolutionists in Hungary and for having, allegedly, tried to contact them. Several of these were school children under the age of 17 at the time of their conviction, who received sentences of as much as 15 years. Some have been held in complete isolation from their families, and under such inhuman conditions that their health has been seriously affected.

It is more than ironic that in Hungary itself the majority of the freedom fighters, who actively participated in the uprising, were released from prison under a general amnesty, while their passive sympathizers imprisoned in Rumania are still kept behind bars.

Recently an official spokesman of the Rumanian government disclosed plans for a general pardon during this coming August that would bring "practically all" of the political prisoners out of jail by the end of this year. At this moment, however, this is merely a promise. But, even if the Rumanian government were to live up to its promise, it still remains to be seen whether the "practically all" will include or exclude those who belong to the Hungarian ethnic group.

Secret Deportation Camps

Many Hungarians released from prison are denied permission to return to their original domicile. Large numbers of them were deemed too dangerous to deserve even this treatment; instead, they have been deported to special penal communities known to

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exist in Petista Raion of the Baraganul region in southeastern Rumania. Several hundred persons live here under the most primitive conditions working at hard labor; many of them are clergymen, educators, and persons respected by their erstwhile communities. To conceal their existence and the location of the camp, they are not permitted to receive visitors or even mail.

Use of Hungarian Language

In callous disregard of the clauses of the peace treaty and the constitution, the government agencies of regions overwhelmingly Hungarian do not accept petitions but in Rumanian and no hearing is given to those who try to speak Hungarian at the courts. In many Hungarian communities Rumanians were appointed as collective farm chairmen who insist that every business be transacted in Rumanian even if they are the only ones fluent in that language. The officials of police and administration are all Rumanians even in the Mures-Magyar Region who refuse to listen to Hungarians without interpreters. Recently the situation got to the point that many stores have refused service to Hungarian customers in localities where 80 percent of the population speaks Hungarian. It is reported that Hungarians speak, when in public, Rumanian among themselves to avoid harassment by the police.

Hungarians in Moldova

The fate of Hungarians who live outside Transylvania in the northeastern part of Rumania, known as Moldova, is even worse. Their number is close to 80,000 living there in isolated communities for centuries. In 1958 all Hungarian schools were closed, forcing even six year old children to study in Rumanian. In addition, Hungarian services in churches were banned, including the singing of hymns in that language. Young people who dare to attend the few Hungarian educational institutes still open in Transylvania cannot return to their original homes, as it happened to students attending the Theological Seminary in Alba Iulia (Gyulafehervar). The Hungarians of Moldova are under heavy pressure to assume Rumanian names and deny their ethnic origin. The intimidation resulted in the fact that less than half of them dared to state Hungarian as their mother tongue at the 1956 census.

Churches

The Hungarian churches, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, are heavily persecuted, much more so than the Rumanian Orthodox faith. The favorite tactic is the imprisonment of Hungarian priests and ministers on trumped-up charges of "anti-state activities." Many clergymen are still in prison, among them four members of the Franciscan order in Dej (Des) and several nuns in Miercurea Ciuc (Csikszerefa). Some of them were even less fortunate like Rev. Father Santha of Sindominic (Csikszentdomokos) who was tortured to death in jail or Rev. Dr. Jozan, Unitarian bishop of Cluj (Kolozsvar) who died after being beaten by the police. The head of the Lutheran Church, Rev. Dr. Jarosi, disappeared without trace along with the known Calvinist minister of Cluj, Rev. Dr. Laszlo.

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At least ten clergymen, upon completion of their prison sentences, were deported to penal settlements in the Baraganul. Even those who avoided this deportation are not permitted to reunite with their congregations. The authorities know that the churches are the last refuges of Hungarian language and culture, and hope that the pastorless parishes will fall apart under the relentless pressure.

Education

Up to 1958 Hungarian schools of all levels were maintained for the Hungarian minority. Since then, the tendency to eliminate or consolidate these into Rumanian institutions has been stronger every year. The first step in this process was to set up parallel Rumanian sections with Rumanian teaching personnel in hitherto all Hungarian schools; then, the students and teachers were forced to demand - in the name of economics and teaching efficiency - the full conversion to Rumanian. This happened in Cluj (Kolozsvar) in 1959, when the Hungarian Bolyai University was consolidated into the Rumanian Babes University. Three professors committed suicide to register their last desperate protest to the elimination of Hungarian as the language of instruction. The Agricultural College of the same city was also abolished in a similar vein.

The College of Medicine of Tirgu Mures (Marosvasarhely), the capital of the Autonomous Region, is gradually being converted to Rumanian; presently only the senior class receives instruction still partly in Hungarian. Applicants are forced to take admission tests in Rumanian and even many of those Hungarians who are able to pass these are not accepted to make place for students from outside Transylvania.

The remaining few technical high schools in the Autonomous Region teach more and more courses in Rumanian and those seeking admission must pass a test in that language. Regular high schools with Hungarian instruction exist only as sections of Rumanian institutes, with increasing number of courses instructed in the Rumanian language. The famous Miko College in Sfintu Gheorghe (Sepsiszentgyorgy) became a Rumanian school where only Hungarian literature is still given in Hungarian.

In the past two years a strong drive was launched to replace Hungarian even in elementary schools. It is reported that for instance in Arad, where Hungarians number 30,000, second graders are required to learn in Rumanian at an age when they have not yet learned to write their mother tongue. Hungarian teachers, although in possession of Rumanian degrees, are required to pass periodic "qualifying examinations" which gives the authorities an opportunity to dismiss them at will.

Cultural Heritage

In conjunction with the attack against Hungarian education a relentless drive was started to destroy the cultural heritage of the Hungarian minority. The libraries and archives of centuries old institutions, e.g. Unitarian College of Cristuru Secuiesc

(Szekelykeresztur) and the Calvinist College of Aiud (Nagyenyed), were crunched with deliberate negligence to a grain storage house in Tirgu Mures (Marosvasarhely), where the invaluable manuscripts and old books were poured on the floor and are being destroyed by mice and dry rot. The libraries of both the Hungarian University and the Transylvanian Museum of Cluj (Kolozsvar) were carted to the same place in 1963 with the purpose of slow destruction. The Szekely National Museum of Sfintu Gheorghe (Sepsiszentgyorgy) was closed as such, and taken over by an all Rumanian management.

And as if these measures were not sufficient, Hungarian cemeteries have been desecrated, as that of Hazzongard in Cluj, where gravestones of prominent Hungarians were sold to stonecutters in an effort to obliterate the mementos that the city not long ago was overwhelmingly Hungarian.

Conclusions

These foregoing measures of discrimination infringe upon the basic human rights with vicious disregard to the United Nations Charter, the Paris Peace Treaty, and even the Rumanian Constitution itself.

The process of forcible assimilation meets the resistance of the Hungarian ethnic minority and will inevitably produce growing tensions within Rumania and among the states of Eastern Europe. These tensions will result in an opportunity for the Soviet Union to re-establish its weakening influence in that area and thus counteract the recent moves by the United States to foster the independence of the satellite countries. It is, therefore, in the interest of this country to persuade the Rumanian government to cease the persecution and oppression of its Hungarian subjects.

Compiled, in the conviction that free men must help those who cannot help themselves, by:

Peter Bocskor
170 East 77th Street
New York, N. Y.

Domokos Pasint
3031 Edwin Avenue
Port Lee, N. J.

Charles Farkass
202 East 96th Street
New York, N. Y.

Charles Teleki
150 Ridge Road
Rutherford, N. J.

July 4, 1964.

Russian Aides Switch to Space-Saving VWs

Beetle-mania is sweeping the Soviet Embassy.

Not the mop-haired moaners from Britain but some diminutive droshkys from West Germany are the objects of the Russians' enchantment.

Embassy staff workers have been trading in their American-made cars and making a collective switchover to cer-

tain stubby little imports whose initials are VW.

A curbside count recently showed that out of 30 cars parked near the embassy and bearing diplomatic tags, 20 were VWs.

An Embassy spokesman explained the beetles' appeal to him:

"In my opinion it's a good car, very convenient and it

helps make the parking problem a bit easier."

The problem, well known to the State Department, has been to provide parking space for about 80 embassy employees who drive to work. The department has been able to get about 20 diplomatic spaces reserved along 16th and L streets nw., but it hasn't helped too much.

The embassy official said the conversion to VWs has been a "chain reaction" among the staffers.

Asked if the switchover to European models might have economic or diplomatic significance, he chuckled and said: "Perhaps it will increase competition between American and West German manufacturers."

THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, Feb. 28, 1965 A 31



The Washington Post

Russians' little cars lined up on 16th Street between L and M Streets nw., near the Soviet Embassy.

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THE WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD

Page


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2/28/65


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
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
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


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







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FBI

Date: 2/3/65

Transmit the following in

Via AIRTEL

(Priority)

65-69260

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-104-MAIN)

FROM: SAC, WFO (66-2479 Sub J)

WFO submits the following plan in its furtherance of the objectives of this program: (U)

In a form letter dated 1/20/65, "Soviet Life" 1706 18th St., N.W., WDC (address of the Soviet Commercial Press offices) extended an invitation to its subscribers to a "Readers' Conference." "Soviet Life" is the official magazine of the Soviet Embassy, published in the English language on a reciprocal basis with the U.S. Dept. of State. The conference is scheduled for 5:30 p.m., 2/12/65 at the Soviet Embassy. The letter sets forth the program of the conference as follows: (U)

1. Introductory remarks by the editor
2. Comments by the readers.
3. Cocktails (U)

Comments in the letter indicate that guests will have opportunity to make suggestions and criticisms and will meet members of the Editorial Board of the magazine. (U)

Bureau

1-WFO Classified By

Exempt from GDS, Category

MJR: MJD Date of Declassification Indefinite

(4)

AIRTEL

Classified by

Exempt from GDS, Category

Date of Declassification Indefinite

D. E. Wick

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
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Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES ADVISED

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DATE 4

9-10-77

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NY 105-55030

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(C)

[REDACTED]

For purposes of information, "Vistenex" is a polymer compound used in the manufacture of pressure sensitive tape. It is the invention of a German company (Badische-Anilin and Soda Fabrik) (BASF), and is sold in the US only by Standard Oil and the American outlet of BASF, the BASF Colors and Chemicals Co., 845 Third Ave., NYC. Although the product is available on the open market, the process for its manufacture is a closely guarded industrial secret. U

[REDACTED]

(C)

- 2 -

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NR NY let 4/2/65

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FBI

Date: 3/10/65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-123502)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (105-15770)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S)
DATE 4-7-57
led poe

[REDACTED]

In regard to the Bureau's suggestions regarding additional anonymous mailings, this matter is under consideration and observations and recommendations will be furnished the Bureau in the near future.

- 1 - Bureau (RM)
- 1 - New York (RM)
- 1 - Washington Field (105-55270) (RM)
- 1 - Chicago

GDB:MAB
(3)

65-69260

65-69260-9

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Classified by 6090
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
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Date of Declassification Indefinite

157 MAR 22 1965

Special Agent in Charge


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

M Per

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-123502-34

25

RED EYE



"SOVIETS AT UN MISSION PHOTOGRAPH THROUGH BLINDS UNVEILING OF PLAQUE REMINDING WORLD OF CONTINUING AND FOSTERED ANTI-SEMITIC POLICIES OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT" (NEWS ITEM) 65-69260 7-16-5-JES

TO THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT THE ONLY JEWISH PROBLEM THEY HAVE IS THE ONE IN THE UNITED STATES. BUT HERE THEY MUST SHOOT WITH JUST A CAMERA!

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-123502)

3/23/65

SAC, CHICAGO (105-15779)

[REDACTED] C

[REDACTED] C

Referenced Bureau letter instructed that observations and recommendations of the Chicago Office be submitted regarding the consideration of additional anonymous mailings regarding this matter. (U)

[REDACTED]

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S)

The Chicago Office does not feel competent, in the matter of writing anonymous letters, to compose these letters and to vary handwriting, etc., which would be a prerequisite to the proposed anonymous mailings. Should this course be decided upon, it is felt that only an individual with a native ability in the Serbo-Croatian language would be logical to be used in the composition of such letters. (U)

[REDACTED]

3 - Bureau (RM)

1 - 65-63485

1 - New York (Info)(RM)

1 - Washington Field (Info)(RM)

2 - Chicago

1 - 105-8489

GBB: gaw

(7)

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Date of Declassification Indefinite

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165-64260-9

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150 MAR 29 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-123502-370

27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum

- 1- Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1- Mr. W.S. Tavel
- 1- Mr. W.A. Branigan

DATE: 4-5-65

- 1- Mr. R.W. Smith
- 1- Mr. C.J. Vizas
- 1- Mr. J.C. Stokes

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
DeLoach _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] C

Purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that Bureau file in captioned matter be maintained in the Special Mail Room, 1315 Identification Building. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be routed to Files and Communications Division for handling.

65-69260

JCS: snp
(7)

*Retain in
Special File Room
4/10/65*

Classified by 3832 3
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC-7

EX-101

5 APR 9 1965

Classified by 6136 1314
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

65 APR 19 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28

Memorandum

TO : W. S. Jantel - wst

DATE: 4-5-65

FROM : P. E. Short

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] C

The attached C.I.A. Special Report has been received in the Records Branch, appropriately initialed, and indicated for file. By use of instant transmittal memorandum, all necessary recording and indexing will be accomplished. It is to be noted this form is for internal use only within the Records Branch, principally by the Routing Unit where bulky material not accompanied by memorandum is usually received.

The enclosure, if bulky and not usually filed with other papers in file, may be detached but this action should be clearly noted under the word "Enclosure." 65-69260-
 Classified by 6080 ^{enc}

Exempt from GDS, Category 2

Date of Declassification indefinite

NOT RECORDED

3 APR 5 1965

Enc
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

67 APR 6 1965

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09

NK 105-17476

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

(C)
The April, 1965, Atlantic City Convention Bureau's convention schedule reveals that the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB) will meet in Convention Hall 4/10-14/65 with an estimated attendance of 15,000. Exhibits will be on display on the main floor of the auditorium.

[REDACTED]
an established source, [REDACTED]

(U)
The registration desk will open at 12 noon on 4/9/65 and remain open until 11:00 pm that date. At 8:30 am on 4/10/65 the meetings and exhibits will open.

(U)
The auditorium in Convention Hall is surrounded by a balcony from which motion pictures or still pictures can readily be taken of the main floor.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

J. C. Stokes

SAC, Boston (105-12435)

4/14/65

Director, FBI (105-135670)

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF 4/14/65
DATE 4/14/65

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Note that there is a discrepancy between information we originally received and the statement of [REDACTED] concerning the identity of the person in Russia to whom he wrote in an effort to obtain his diploma. The original source reported that [REDACTED] wrote to his sister whereas on interview [REDACTED] stated that sometime ago, date not indicated, he wrote to his brother, [REDACTED] since deceased, date of demise not stated.

Despite the fact you have interviewed [REDACTED] and reviewed his INS record, no information has been obtained concerning his early history in the Soviet Union; the nature of his employments prior to entering the U.S. or for that matter prior to his present employment at the [REDACTED]. We do not know from what country [REDACTED] emigrated to the U.S. although it is presumed that he came from [REDACTED]. No information has been obtained concerning the identity of his present relatives in the Soviet Union and we do not know when and under what conditions he left the USSR. Relet indicates that [REDACTED] claimed his niece (unnamed) in Russia gave his diploma to some Russian official office and asked if they could locate him in the U.S. through his sister. We do not know how [REDACTED] knows this.

- 1 - Boston [REDACTED]
2 - New York [REDACTED]

1 - 65-6920 [REDACTED]

105-135670-4
NOT RECORDED

Classified by [REDACTED]
Exempt from GDS, Category [REDACTED]
Date of Declassification Indefinite
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

105-135670-4
105-135670-4
105-135670-4

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-135670-4

Letter to SAC, Boston

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In addition, it would be helpful to know full details concerning [redacted] education as well as information as to the exact nature of his present employment and his future plans. Ascertain the type of work [redacted] feels his education should enable him to perform and examine his Russian diploma and ask him to translate same if necessary. (U)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(c)

NOTE:

[redacted]

(c)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(C)

While this letter is not meant to be a review of all the historical and political factors surrounding the Polish-German problem, it would be well to recall that following World War II certain of Poland's pre-war eastern territories were annexed by the Soviet Union and the pre-war German territory of East Prussia was divided between the Soviet Union and Poland and Poland's western boundary was moved to be along the Oder and Neisse Rivers which meant that the pre-war German territories of Pomerania and Silesia fell under Polish administration. The Soviet Union immediately granted formal recognition of the current boundaries of Poland; however, the United States has not formally recognized these boundaries, our policy being that the final settlement of the Polish-German boundary cannot be established until a peace treaty can be signed with a united Germany. (U)

[REDACTED]

SECRET

- 3 -

Apr 20

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33

CG 105-8223

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(C)
It is noted that at this very time Soviet Prime Minister ALEXEI KOSYGIN and CPSU Chief LEONID BREZHNEV are visiting Poland, at which time they apparently intend to sign a treaty to supplement the original 20 year treaty of Polish-German friendship at the end of World War II.

(U)

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CG 105-8223

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105-8223

[REDACTED]

It is admitted that all of the above is general in nature but we are being this general in view of the instructions contained in referenced Bureau airtel and our specific recommendations for the implementation of this program will be submitted separately.

(U)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(C)

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~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

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NY 65-

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[REDACTED] (C)

Over the years, our approach to investigative problems in the intelligence field has given rise to a number of new programs, some of which have been most revolutionary, and it can be presumed that with a continued aggressive approach to these problems, new and productive ideas will be forthcoming. These ideas will not be increased in number or improved upon from the standpoint of accomplishments merely through the institution of a program such as COINTELPRO which is given another name, and which, in fact, only encompasses everything that has been done in the past or will be done in the future. (C)

[REDACTED] (C)

[REDACTED] (C)

[REDACTED] (C)

[REDACTED] (C)

SECRET

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
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
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
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~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

 (U)

Enclosed for the Bureau are three copies, and for Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit, and New York, one copy each for information of remarks by Congressmen SEYMOUR HALPERN (NY) and EDWARD J. PATTEN (NJ) which appeared in March 24, 1965, issue of Congressional Record. The remarks concern alleged Rumanian persecution of Hungarians living in the Transylvania section of Rumania. Information copies are being sent to above noted offices for appropriate COINTELPRO files in view of the continuous investigative interest of those offices in Rumanian-Hungarian matters. (U)





~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NP W40 a/t 4/23/65

37

Interpretations with Soviet Russia, has stepped up its repressive measures against the Hungarian minority in Transylvania for the past 7 years, and no end to these measures is in sight. Yet, the Hungarian minority in Transylvania is numerous and culturally and scientifically probably the most constructive element in the province. Even according to the Rumanian census of 1956, its number reaches 1.65 million, more than the population of many newly independent nations.

The sufferings of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania started already in 1945-46 when Rumania acquired a pro-Communist, later a fully Communist, regime. Former leaders of the minority were jailed or slain, and the remaining Hungarian middle classes were robbed of their livelihood and forced to live outside of Transylvania under subhuman conditions as deportees. A Communist organization was superimposed upon the minority. A Hungarian bishop was imprisoned, and to this day, he is kept under house arrest.

However, until 1957, the persecution was part of a great campaign against all non-Communist and anti-Communist elements in Rumania and many Rumanians also shared the fate of their Hungarian counterparts in Transylvania.

In the Stalinist period, the Gheorghiu-Dej government insisted that Communist rule had solved the nationality problem in Transylvania by granting "equality" to the Hungarian and other minorities. A "Magyar autonomous province" was created and Hungarian schools were generally maintained, though they had to teach Communist propaganda in order to indoctrinate the youth.

However, even this 1952 solution remained inadequate. The Magyar autonomous province included only about one-third of the Hungarians living in Transylvania, that part of Rumania which formerly belonged to Hungary. Deportations of "class aliens" and the settlement of Rumanian refugees from Bessarabia—which was ceded to the Soviet Union—slowly changed the composition of the city population of Kolozsvár, the capital of Transylvania, Nagyvarad—Oradea—and other centers from a predominantly Hungarian to a mixed or Rumanian one.

Even this relatively mild situation was altered by 1957. In October and November 1956 the Hungarian population in Hungary rose against their Communist masters and against the intervening Red Army. During the ten days of success of this fight for freedom the Transylvanian Hungarians were also in a state of ferment and unrest. Demonstrations occurred in three major areas. Army units composed of Rumanians alone had to occupy the cities and the Magyar province in order to prevent uprisings. The Rumanian Army as such could not be used against the rebellious Hungarians in Hungary, mainly because of the questionable loyalty of the Hungarian components.

Slagging blows of the Gheorghiu-Dej regime hit the Hungarian minority in Transylvania in 1957 and early 1958.

First, hundreds of Hungarians, Communists and non-Communists, were arrested in 1957 upon charges of sympathizing with the Hungarian rebels of 1956. Those arrested included the more nationally conscious members of the Hungarian section of the Rumanian Communist Party. Only in Kolozsvár scores of them were put to a show trial and over several of them were executed. Realistic figures of those executed in the purges is estimated in the hundreds and those sentenced to long prison terms, in the thousands. Even those not arrested were often removed from their positions on local administration and many a Hungarian Communist in Transylvania had to make public self-criticism stating that he had succumbed to bourgeois nationalism. The terror was used to abolish Hungarian educational institutions. In early 1958 students of the Bolyai Hungarian University at Kolozsvár—Cluj—"petitioned" the administration to merge with the Rumanian Babes University in the same city in order "to avoid cultural isolation." The college at Nagyenyed—Alud—followed suit. After a dramatic meeting, in May, 1958, the Bolyai University faculty voted the merger, after which three of the participating professors committed suicide. Today, Hungarian literature is taught in Hungarian language only at the Bolyai-Babes University, and the proportion of Rumanian-Hungarian students is about three to one there.

The Bolyai University was not the only victim of the purges begun in 1958. In most Hungarian grade and high schools, parallel Rumanian sections were introduced. It took usually between 3 to 5 years of bribing and intimidation on the part of the authorities to make the parents and students apply for a merger of the Hungarian sections with the Rumanian ones into one Rumanian school. Today, there are hardly any high schools and only a small number of grade schools where Hungarian is the language of instruction. Even in purely Hungarian areas, Hungarian is only taught as a foreign language. In practice, because of the mergers, only the first-born sons of the Hungarian families are still sent to Hungarian schools, as their distance necessitates boarding costs.

The Magyar autonomous province, the last bulwark of Transylvanian Hungarians, was hit next. Under the euphemism of administrative reform, the districts of Háromszék—Trei Scăune—with their almost 100-percent Hungarian population were attached to the largely Rumanian province of Brasov—Brassó—thereby putting more Hungarians outside of the autonomous province. This was, however, not sufficient for the Gheorghiu-Dej regime. Other districts were united with the autonomous province, further reducing its Hungarian character. While in 1952, the province was 79 percent Hungarian, after 1961 the Mures autonomous province, as it is officially called, had only a 63-percent Hungarian majority, and only half of the local officials were Hungarians.

Not only by administrative transfers and by the abolition of the name Hungarian-Magyar in the autonomous prov-

THE PRESENT SITUATION OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN TRANSYLVANIA

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. HALPERN) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, several of my colleagues have referred to the persecution of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, now a Rumanian province, during the 2d session of the last Congress. They included my colleague from New York (Mr. LINDSAY) and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. ASHBROOK).

It remains a fact that the Rumanian Communist Government, despite its differences on economic and ideological in-

APR 10/65 4-23-65

ENCLOSURE

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ince, but also by enforced population transfers, the Gheorghiu-Dej regime tries to scatter the Hungarian minority in order to facilitate its Rumanization. This fact was also acknowledged by the State Department in answering inquiries. The population transfers take various forms. First, Hungarian professionals are prevented from assuming leadership in the Hungarian community. Every professional person must apply to the state for his job, and the location of employment invariably lies outside of the autonomous province, or any other Hungarian inhabited area in Transylvania. More often than not, Hungarian professionals are sent into parts of Rumania outside of Transylvania. The number of Hungarian professionals is steadily decreasing. One infamous regulation prevents the admission of Hungarian students to the universities over and beyond a certain small ratio of the Rumanian students in the same field.

Industrialization proceeds at an increasing tempo in Transylvania, and the new plants, even in Hungarian areas, are staffed by Rumanians from manager to engineer to unskilled laborers. Thereby mixed areas and cities receive an increasingly Rumanian profile, while purely Hungarian areas become mixed. The manpower surplus of the Hungarian areas goes usually to Brasov and Bucharest in the south, and some sources maintain that Bucharest already has almost 200,000 Hungarians, making it the second largest Hungarian city after Budapest.

In addition to the enforced move of engineers and professionals as well as skilled workers between Rumanian and Hungarian areas in Transylvania, the Gheorghiu-Dej regime is also reviving language restrictions. Outside of the Mures autonomous province the use of the Hungarian language is forbidden in public, despite constitutional guarantees. Even in the Mures autonomous province, shopkeepers are forced to speak Rumanian only. These restrictions were confirmed by the foreign correspondent of the Reporter magazine, Mr. George Bailey, in the November 19, 1964, issue.

Mr. Bailey is not the only one reporting about the sad fate of the Transylvanian Hungarians. In May 1963, Edward Crankshaw, the noted British journalist and writer, also broached the subject in a syndicated article in the Observer. The Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists in June 1964 summarized the ordinances and decrees in violation of the human and civil rights of the Hungarian minority.

Here in the House, several Members have raised their voices against the injustice. In the Senate, a former Foreign Service officer and now the able Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. Pratt) warned against our courting of Rumania without substantial concessions on Rumania's part with respect to the observation of human and minority rights.

For all these repressive measures form part of a larger political plan on the part of the Communist regime to eradicate the Hungarian minority in Transylvania within the next 10 or 15 years. At the same time, the Communist regime tries

to improve relations with the United States and other Western nations, especially in the economic and cultural fields. We must watch out that in our well-intentioned drive to promote polycentrism in Eastern Europe we do not become participants to a subtle, but nonetheless lethal, genocide of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania which resided there since the 10th century and shaped the history of the region for a thousand years until 1918.

In this connection, I have today introduced, for appropriate reference, a House resolution condemning the discrimination perpetrated by the Rumanian Government against its Hungarian minority. I ask that it be read into the Record at this point, together with other documentation. Also, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that Members may have permission to revise and extend their remarks for the Record.

H. RES. 291

Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with respect to discriminatory practices by the Government of Rumania

Whereas the Government of Rumania is engaging in a deliberate policy of discrimination against the Hungarian minority population under its jurisdiction in educational, cultural, economic, linguistic, and administrative fields; and

Whereas this discrimination is clearly contrary to commonly accepted principles of international law and justice; and

Whereas, in accordance with the provisions of the 1947 Peace Treaty, the Government of Rumania undertook the obligation to grant the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all persons within her territorial and sovereign jurisdiction without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

Whereas the International Commission of Jurists has reported the occurrence of numerous instances of discrimination on the part of the Government of Rumania against the Hungarian minority population of Transylvania; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the discriminatory practices perpetrated by the Government of Rumania against the Hungarian minority peoples be condemned.

TROUBLE OVER TRANSYLVANIA

(By George Bailey)

TRACU MURES.—Rumania, in its own inimitable fashion, offers an instructive sampling of the tensions and contradictions that are tearing the Communist world apart. In this country, a general restiveness and political opportunism have gone so far that criticism of Moscow's leadership has taken more or less official forms.

Shortly after the return of a Rumanian delegation that had been dispatched to Peking early this year in an attempt to mediate the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Rumanian Workers' Party published a 60-page declaration on its position with regard to the international Communist movement. The tract was explicitly directed against the Khrushchevian doctrine of apportioning economic activities to individual nations within the Communist bloc. As a declaration of economic independence, the document was anticlimactic. In the first 5 years of its drive to achieve "rapid and comprehensive industrialization," Rumania had already doubled its volume of trade with non-Communist countries while reducing its trade volume with Communist countries by one quarter. Within the same period Rumania had spent roughly half a billion dollars for industrial

plant, equipment, and employment of technicians from the West, and more than a billion dollars have been earmarked for purchases in the West during the next 5-year period. Moreover, at a time when all other satellite countries were sharply reducing their trade with China, Rumania actually increased its China trade appreciably. In effect, Rumania had already become another Yugoslavia, a comparison that has been heightened by Yugoslavia's recent accession to Comecon as an associate member, while Rumania has been loosening its ties with that economic organization of the Eastern bloc.

But the declaration last April was much more than a formulated insistence on "economic self-determination." It was a manifesto proclaiming "the basic principles of the new type of relations between Socialist countries" and ruling out interference of any kind from any quarter in the political and cultural as well as the economic affairs of a "socialist and therefore truly sovereign country." The manifesto turned the Soviet prescription for collective action inside out, since it declared foreign policy an inviolable part of individual state sovereignty.

Above all, coming as it did in the form of a report on the mission to Peking and a subsequent stopover in the Crimea, it took on the color of an official ruling on the Sino-Soviet dispute. In this sense, while professing incidental preference for some of the Russian arguments, the Rumanian leadership found for China. The finding was reinforced by Rumania's refusal to attend Khrushchev's ill-starred congress of Communist Parties to deal with China. The Rumanians had long ago discerned what the explosion of a Chinese atom bomb and its complement, the fall of Khrushchev, have since made generally clear—that China could not and can never be drummed out of the Communist movement. And both of these recent confirmatory developments have made the Rumanian leadership more confident than ever.

In fact, the Rumanian Communists have outwitted and outmaneuvered the Soviet Union at virtually every turn in a long course of events extending at least as far back as the 1952 ouster of the Moscow loyalist, Ana Pauker, and her clique. Then, or not long afterward, they reverted to their native tradition of circumspect doubledealing and discreet intrigue. Among the switches and shifts of the ideological shell game that ensued, there was none more successful than the Rumanian substitution of derussification for destalinization. To the delight of the Russophobic populace, by 1963 the Rumanian authorities had liquidated the Gorki Institute of Russian Studies, the Russian bookstore, the Rumanian edition of the Soviet magazine, New Times, and the obligatory study of the Russian language in all schools and universities. Since then virtually all Russian street and place names have disappeared.

But derussification is merely one of the many negative aspects of Rumanianization. Acting ostensibly as the honest and impeccably Communist broker between the Soviet Union and China, the Rumanians have actually cleared the way for their own traditional brand of supernaturalism. "Greater Rumania," said a Communist diplomat recently, "is the whore of the Socialist camp, a Balkan whore bent on Balkanizing the Communist bloc." The Rumanian talent for divisiveness has nowhere been more evident than in the handling of the oldest Balkan problem of them all: Transylvania.

CLAUSTARKIAN SHOWPIECE

It has long been axiomatic that great powers adjust Balkan borders to suit their own purposes. This is particularly true of Transylvania, which has been passed back and forth almost as often as a bottle at a Balkan party. In the Treaty of Trianon, 1920, the Western Allies dismantled the Austro-Hungarian Empire, stripping Hun-

gary of two-thirds of its territory and almost one-third of its population and ceding the greater part of both to Rumania. With the Vienna Award of 1940, Hitler gave the northern half of Transylvania, including its capital city of Cluj, back to Hungary and so stimulated a competition between Hungary and Rumania for Nazi favor in the field against the Russians, the Hungarian troops fighting for the addition of the southern half of Transylvania, the Rumanians fighting for the return of the northern half. Similarly, the Soviets at the close of the Second World War restored the Trianon border between Hungary and Rumania, calculating that this would tend to offset the Soviet Union's annexation of Bessarabia and the Bukovina from Rumania on the east and provide a popular national issue favoring the Communist-dominated government in Rumania; furthermore, the consequent failure of the not-yet Communist Hungary to obtain any sort of satisfaction on Transylvania might weaken the leading Smallholders' Party, which was the main obstacle in the way of a Communist takeover in Hungary. Like Hitler, the Soviets sought to use the Transylvanian issue as a means of keeping both Hungary and Rumania under control.

Naturally, there are a great many people who consider themselves Hungarians now living in Rumanian territory. More than half a million of them inhabit the strip of territory some 30 miles wide along the Hungarian-Rumanian border. This area, properly speaking, is not and never was part of Transylvania. It is made up of four counties of the old kingdom of Hungary and is geographically an extension of the central Hungarian plain. The other main concentration of Hungarians in Rumania is the solid block of Szeklers, some 700,000 strong, who have inhabited most of eastern Transylvania since the 10th century. The Szekler area lies almost exactly in the center of Rumania, more than 100 miles to the east of the Hungarian border. King Carol had agreed to cede the border area—the so-called Partium—to Hungary even before the Vienna Award was forced upon him, and the Hungarians had great hopes that the Soviets would undertake some doctoring of the border, especially after Hungary became Communist.

Instead the Soviets chose to provide an object lesson in Marxism-Leninism by applying the principle of genuine proletarian internationalism for all Communists to the 1,700,000 Hungarians in Rumania, who constitute the largest ethnic minority in Eastern Europe. Thus, article 82 of the Rumanian Constitution of 1952 provides that "Every individual national group may freely make use of its own language, and may freely visit at every level those institutions of general education in which instruction is given in its mother tongue . . ." and articles 19, 20, and 21 attempted to solve the millennial problem of the Szeklers through the creation of the autonomous Hungarian region. Modeled on the autonomous regions within the individual Soviet Republics, it was clearly meant to serve as a showpiece of genuine proletarian internationalism. Communist functionaries from Moscow, Bucharest, and Budapest converged on the region. Stakhanovites from all three countries were sent to instruct and inspire the workers, youth brigades were organized, factories and roads were built, farmers were persuaded or forced to join collectives. But then came the Hungarian revolt.

In retrospect, it is apparent that the Hungarian revolt in the fall of 1956 was the turning point in the course of communism in Europe. Establishing the Hungarians as the archenemies in the eyes of the Soviets, it provided the Rumanian Communist Party with a classic opportunity to demonstrate its

loyalty to the Soviet Union. The Rumanian Communists were in a position to render the Soviet Union a signal service in playing host to Imre Nagy, Pal Maléter, and other leaders of the Hungarian revolt during their long incarceration and subsequent execution, relieving the Russians of the onus of deporting the rebels to the Soviet Union. They were also able to help the Soviet Union in Hungary by sending Hungarian-speaking "goon squads" to Budapest and the provinces to reinforce the decimated and thoroughly demoralized Hungarian Security Service.

At the same time, the Hungarian revolt thoroughly alarmed the Rumanian Communists. The reason was simple enough: the same anticommunism that exploded in Hungary immediately spread to the Hungarian minority in Rumania. As in Hungary, students, teachers, and university professors were in the forefront of the action. There were student demonstrations in Cluj, in Medias, in Timisoara, and in the administrative center of the Hungarian autonomous region, Tirgu Mures—in fact in every area where there were Hungarian students in any numbers. Furthermore, the revolt threatened to catch fire among the Rumanian peasantry and the country's intellectuals. Some of the more circumspect Rumanians were only waiting to see whether the West would support Hungary. When that didn't happen, the Hungarians were obviously doomed.

There followed the Soviet isolation of Hungary and the branding of the Hungarians as fascists and chauvinists. The Rumanians were quick to take the Soviet cue, exploiting the official condemnation of the Hungarians to the hilt and applying it particularly to the Hungarian minority in Rumania. For the moment the Hungarian minority in Rumania rose in sympathy with the Hungarian revolution. Rumanians tended to see the whole thing as a part of the old campaign for the annexation of territory in Transylvania to Hungary. Thus the Rumanian Communist Party was not only fighting for its life, it was also fighting for what every Rumanian considers Rumanian national territory.

Russian troops put down the disorder in Rumania and thousands of Hungarians were arrested, perhaps hundreds put to death. In one trial alone in Cluj, 13 out of 57 accused were executed. This year some 8,000 political prisoners were released with considerable fanfare by the Rumanian Government in a general amnesty. But as far as I could ascertain in my recent travels through Transylvania, not one of the Hungarians arrested during the revolt has yet been released.

THE CAPITAL OF LIMBO

Two years after the revolt, the Rumanian Government received the great and all-important prize for loyalty and services rendered to the Soviets—the withdrawal of the Red Army. "Genuine proletarian internationalism" is also gone, and the Rumanian desire to keep the Hungarian minority in its place has found more and more ways of expressing itself. In 1959, the rector of the Bolyai University, Prof. Lajos Takacs, expressed his regret over the "nationalist isolation" of the Hungarian minority and requested the ministry of education "to examine the advisability of having two universities in Cluj." In June, 1959, the students and professors "unanimously approved" the merger of their university with the Rumanian Babes University.

Late in 1960, the Rumanian Government undertook the administrative reorganization of the entire country, ostensibly to effect a more rational economic division among the various territories. Actually, the reorganization achieved the ethnic gerrymandering of the autonomous Hungarian region, and the authorities have used economic measures to break up the Szekler communities and dis-

se the fragments throughout the country. The closing of Hungarian cultural institutions has also continued. The 600-year-old Hungarian college at Alud was closed and its library impounded. In 1962 the last Hungarian institution of higher learning, the Institute of Medicine and Pharmacy at Tirgu Mures, was liquidated outright; the Rumanian authorities did not even bother to cloak the operation as a merger. The liquidation was officially described as "the reduction of Hungarian-language classes" at the Institute.

It was in 1962 that the Rumanians launched their main administrative assault against the autonomous region. All key positions in administration and industry were taken over by Rumanians. Dimitru Poni, a Rumanian, was appointed chairman of the regional people's council. The Hungarian Writers' Association in Tirgu Mures was merged with a Rumanian Writers' Association imported for that purpose. In the same way, the Szekler State Theater was enlarged by the addition of a Rumanian section. The most far-reaching measure, however, was the merging of Hungarian with Rumanian schools. By the end of 1962 there was no longer a single wholly separate Hungarian school in Rumania. Within 2 years the new dispensation had made a mockery of the constitution's guarantee of access to schools, where instruction is given in each people's "mother tongue." Rumanian has effectively replaced Hungarian at every level as the language of official and public life. This is not only because the leaders and key functionaries of the region are all Rumanians who know no Hungarian; employees throughout the region have been put on notice that if they fail to use Rumanian in public they will be summarily dismissed.

I have seen how these regulations work. When I stepped into a shop in Tirgu Mures and addressed the salesclerk in Hungarian, he answered in Rumanian. I persisted in Hungarian. He persisted in Rumanian. Finally I asked him if he spoke Hungarian. "Whenever I can," he answered in Hungarian, "but we are under orders to speak Rumanian to customers." I asked if Tirgu Mures was not the capital of the Hungarian region. "This is the capital of Limbo," he replied.

Rumania's transformation from an obsequious satellite practicing "genuine proletarian internationalism" to a fiercely independent national state pursuing a policy of forcible assimilation of minorities is accompanied by a propaganda offensive on a broad front that includes the reinterpretation of history as a method of furthering the Romanization of Rumania. Rumanian writers have taken issue with Soviet historians on the apportionment of roles in the liberation of Rumania from the fascist yoke and won their point. The spate of articles and brochures produced to document the party's leading role in the "victorious armed uprising of August 1944," and the exploits of "the new Rumanian Army" is often supplemented with situation maps giving the positions and movements of the Rumanian units and "patriotic battle groups" in overrunning the "German-Hungarian forces" in Transylvania. The last map in one series I have seen delineates "the participation of the Rumanian Army in battles on Hungarian and Czechoslovak territory" in such a way that the Rumanian Army—not the Soviet Army—clearly developed the main thrust in the campaign to liberate Budapest and Prague.

The main target for historical revision, however, is what Rumanian writers refer to as "the Hapsburg occupation," especially during its final period. At a conference of historians held last May in Hungary, Rumanians expounded their theory of "double exploitation and oppression of the masses by the dominant nations of Austria-Hungary."

The great majority of landowners, the old, had been Hungarian and German; the great majority of peasants had been Slavs and Rumanians. This resulted in a double burden of national as well as social oppression. The Hungarian hosts, a West German, and a Soviet historian denied the validity of the theory, which not only equates classes with nations but also distinguishes between the nationalism of dominant nations ("imperialist chauvinism") and the nationalism of suppressed nations ("national liberation movements"). The theory was not designed merely to denigrate the Hungarians retroactively justifying Rumanian possession of Transylvania; it was also the academic celebration of Rumania's right to develop its entire range of basic industries as a unitary, independent, and fully equal state, not to be exploited by industrially dominant countries such as the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany within Comecon.

THE HUNGARIAN HANDICAP

There is no doubt that the legacy of the Habsburg Empire and its Hungarian Horthy "regency" of 1920-1944 has weighed heavily on the Hungarian Communists. As model proletarian internationalists, they have been constrained from the first to single out Hungarian history for special censure, an exercise in which they found themselves enthusiastically abetted by Rumanians, Czechs, and Yugoslavs, all of whose countries have large Hungarian minorities. For faithful Communists, the Hungarian revolt only proved that the Hungarians have still not managed to outlive their fascist-chauvinist past. In his preface to the new two-volume "History of Hungary," which appeared early this year, Eric Molnar states that the purpose of the work is "to expound Hungarian history in connection with the histories of our neighbor nations and by this means liquidate the Magyar global Hungarocentric, nationalistic point of view."

Even for Communists, it is difficult to promote their national interests while decrying the national character. The Rumanians can—and repeatedly do—tie the Hungarians in knots merely by reminding them of the Leninist rules by which the Hungarians (but not, apparently, the Rumanians) are bound. Thus the world was treated in early 1962 to the spectacle of the Hungarian Government prosecuting Hungarian patriots on Hungarian soil at the insistence of the Rumanian Government. A group of refugee Transylvanian intellectuals—there are many such in Hungary—had been holding regular meetings to consider what could be done to relieve the plight of the Hungarian minority. The Rumanian Government learned of the activity and demanded that the Kadar regime make an example of the group's leaders or bear responsibility for the breakdown of "Hungarian-Rumanian friendship." Three of the former Transylvanians were tried and sentenced. One, Dr. Sándor Puskás, was sentenced to 4½ years in prison; the others got off a little lighter.

In retrospect, we can see that the Hungarian revolt, whose first demand was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, made the continued presence of Soviet troops in Hungary essential to the existence of a Communist regime. Furthermore, the revolt virtually stripped the Kadar regime of any room for diplomatic maneuver inside as well as outside the Soviet bloc—particularly since the Rumanian Communist Party was able to turn the revolution to its own nationalistic purposes. And in the process, not surprisingly, Hungary's unequal struggle with Rumania has strained many a prominent Hungarian Communist's doctrinal allegiance to the breaking point. There is the persistent rumor in Budapest that former Foreign Minister Endre Sik, who had done yeoman service for the Kadar regime in the United Nations following the 1956 revolt,

resigned in September 1961 when Kadar refused to forward to Moscow a protest Sik had prepared on the Transylvanian situation. I can report that the atmosphere in even the top echelon of the Hungarian Communist Party is such that the rumor seems entirely plausible.

Meanwhile relations between Hungary and Rumania have deteriorated still further. Traditionally the churches have played a signal role in the alternate Magyarization and Romanization of Transylvania; in general, the Catholic and Protestant Churches reflect Hungarian and German interests, while the Orthodox Church has always embodied the ethnic state religion of the Rumanians. As a result, Rumanian Communists have taken to supporting the Orthodox Church as their pawn in the struggle and persecuting the Catholic and Protestant Churches as Hungarian pawns. This spring, Rumanian authorities announced their intention to demolish the historic church of St. Lajos, which they characterized as an eyesore, in the middle of the main square of Oradea. To prevent this, several thousand Hungarians took up a day-and-night vigil around the church for more than a week—an action that paralyzed traffic and threatened to produce a major riot at any moment. The Rumanian authorities finally reversed their decision—temporarily.

The greatest single source of irritation to the Hungarians is the state cultural agreement with Rumania. Strict Rumanian application of the terms of the agreement has prevented the Hungarian Government from establishing any sort of cultural link between the homeland and the minority. Hungarians in Rumania are restricted to a mere half dozen classical Hungarian authors such as the 19th-century epic poet János Arany and the lyricist Endre Ady. Most other books in Hungarian are translations of Rumanian authors. According to the terms of the agreement, no book concerning Transylvania may be published in Hungary without the approval of the Rumanian censors. Radio and television broadcasting are not restricted by the agreement, and here the Hungarians enjoy a geographical advantage since most of Transylvania is closer to Hungary than to Bucharest, which is on the other side of the Transylvanian Alps in any event. However, Radio Bucharest competes with Radio Kossuth in Hungarian-language programs, and the Rumanian authorities advise against listening to the Hungarian state radio.

The only comic relief in the situation is provided by the use both sides have made of the Hungarian-Rumanian film-exchange program. The Hungarian Government always takes the maximum of eight films a year—even though the notoriously poor Rumanian films are boxoffice poison—in order to insinuate an equal number of Hungarian films into Rumania. The Hungarians were incensed, however, when the Rumanians dubbed in Rumanian-language sound tracks and then added insult to injury by providing the minority with Hungarian subtitles. When the Hungarian Government protested, the Rumanians stopped the dubbing and provided Rumanian subtitles—but then deliberately desynchronized the Hungarian sound tracks. The old subtitles in Hungarian were at least legible.

The Rumanian authorities have adopted a wide variety of other measures to isolate the Hungarian minority from contact with what most of them think of as their homeland. A Hungarian in Rumania must wait from 6 months to a year for permission to visit relatives in Hungary—if he is lucky. Foreign tourists in Rumania are allowed the run of the country—unless the tourist happens to be a Hungarian citizen. In this case he is restricted to a radius of 6 kilometers from the center of the location he designates as his destination upon entering the coun-

try. If he oversteps this limit, the Hungarian tourist is arrested, interrogated, and summarily deported—if he is lucky. There were 32 Hungarian-language dailies in pre-war Rumania; today there is one—which nobody reads at all. All these changes, Hungarians on both sides of the border must remind themselves ruefully, are the fruits of communism.

A hopeless dilemma confronts the powerful Hungarian wing of the Rumanian Communist Party: its members must support, if not actively implement, the Rumanian Government's antiminority policy. As a result, the Hungarian wing has been purged by the Rumanian party leadership and ostracized by the Hungarian minority. As nearly as I could make out, the only crumb Hungarian Communists in Budapest can proffer to Hungarians in Rumania is the advice that they should infiltrate the Rumanian Communist Party in order to promote the practice of Leninist principles, particularly as regards minorities.

According to one historian I talked with, the organization of the Szekely area as an autonomous region put the Russians in a position "to balance the old Transylvanian question between Rumania and Hungary." But the position was abandoned with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania. Since then, the Soviet Union has kept pretty much out of the situation. In a speech during his visit to Hungary last spring, Khrushchev made a watered-down reference to the proper care and feeding of minorities. The Hungarians were openly dissatisfied with it, but about all they have been able to do is make official but unpublicized protests to the Rumanian Government. Recently, Premier Kadar upbraided the Rumanian delegation in Budapest over the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Rumania, but the Premier apparently succeeded only in leaving his visitors "highly offended."

The Rumanians were among the first to recognize "genuine proletarian internationalism" as merely a Soviet device to justify maintenance of military bases in Eastern Europe and so secure Soviet economic exploitation. And even this Soviet desire has been skillfully used by the Rumanians in the service of their own national cause, leaving others to make the sacrifices for the sake of international communism. In effect, Rumania capitalized on the misconceived gallantry of the Hungarians, whose revolt gave their neighbor a chance to win concessions from the Russians.

And through it all, the Rumanians clearly foresaw the reemergence of nationalism, which Communist theoreticians used to call "the main danger to the successful construction of the new state system." Far from being surprised by the Sino-Soviet split, the Bucharest government was banking on it. As a widely quoted Rumanian proverb has it: "In time the waters recede, the rocks remain."

THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY PROBLEM IN RUMANIA

(Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists, No. 17)

From the 11th century until 1918, Transylvania, a region of some 23,300 square miles, or some 40,700 if the larger area including Maramures, Crisana and the Banat is included, came in one way or another under Hungarian rule. In 1918, it was added to Rumania as a region then consisting of some five and a quarter million, of whom half a million were German, one and a half million Magyar and the remainder Rumanian. There is a bitter and bloody history of national tensions. The region now comprises one of the most important national and linguistic minorities in Eastern Europe and provides an absorbing case study on the treatment of minorities in a Communist People's Republic. The total Hungarian pop-

ulation of Rumania, according to the 1956 census, was approximately 0.1 percent.

The detection of discrimination in most countries is a difficult process which does not appear from the *ipsissima verba* of legislation and it is difficult to pin down administrative practice as discriminatory unless the group discriminated against is expressly designated. It is usually a simpler process to examine legislation and practice to see what is missing from the point of view of the rights of a group in question. In a Communist state the denial of freedom to any particular group must be examined in the context of the entire social and political outlook of the state, since many rights and freedoms as understood in liberal democracies are denied to the whole population. If it be that a particular group resists the process of socialization more vigorously than another, it is not easy to see the line between discrimination against that group and the employment of greater force to deal with greater resistance. These facets of a Communist state have been much in evidence in the past and it is against this background that the minority question in Transylvania has to be considered. The experience of the Chinese People's Republic, with the peculiar blend of communism and chauvinism on the part of the ethnic majority, viz. the Great Han, toward the Tibetans was, for example, admitted by the Chinese themselves. Again, discrimination exists in the Communist ideology itself, but is part of the general doctrine that social progress is to be achieved through the strengthening of the proletariat, which requires for its accomplishment the strengthening of class consciousness among the people. This has nothing to do with discrimination against a national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic group.

A further obstacle to a fully documented study of minority problems in Transylvania is the absence of sufficient reliable data. In a Communist society the public ventilation of grievances at the political level is severely restricted and silence extends also to minorities with a grievance.

THE PEACE TREATY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 1952

The peace treaty concluded between the allied powers and Rumania in 1947, stipulates in Part II (political clauses), section 1, article 3 that:

1. Rumania shall take the steps necessary to secure to all persons under Rumanian jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion, and of public meeting.

2. Rumania further undertakes that the laws in force in Rumania shall not, either in their content or in their application, discriminate or entail any discrimination between persons of Rumanian nationality on the grounds of their race, sex, language, or religion, whether in reference to their persons, property, business, professional, or financial interests, status, political, or civil rights or any other matter.

Thus, the wording of the peace treaty clearly excludes discrimination against minorities and it is of little consequence whether the Hungarians in Transylvania are to be regarded as a linguistic or racial group, since their language alone is sufficient to bring them within this protection.

Particularly striking, both with reference to the peace treaty and in comparison with the constitutions of most other people's democracies, are the provisions of article 82 of the Rumanian Constitution of 1952. This article provides that all the national groups in the territory of the Rumanian People's Republic are entitled to use their respective languages and to have at all levels establishments of public education in which instruction

is given in their mother tongue. It is further that the spoken and written language used by administrative and judicial authorities in districts where a national group other than Rumanian is in the majority should be the language of this national group; civil servants in such areas should be appointed from among members of this majority group, or if from other groups, it is necessary that they speak the language of the majority. Article 84 follows the lines of the Soviet Constitution in recognizing not only the separation of church and state but also the exclusion of the church from education. No religious community may have its own educational establishments, but theological schools may train people to carry out their part in religious services. In two other articles the constitution deals with the rights of national minorities. In article 17, which lists the duties of the Rumanian states, there is a duty owed by the state to protect national minorities and especially their culture, which ought to be socialistic in its content and national in its form. Article 81 goes into the realm of enforceable legal sanctions protecting minorities and within the general framework of provisions concerning equality before the law it is provided that any kind of chauvinistic persecution of non-Rumanian national minorities or any kind of propaganda calculated to bring about such persecution is a criminal offense.

It should be noted that only the cultural rights of minorities are mentioned and article 17 designates the Rumanian state as unitary, independent, and sovereign, thus excluding any form of federation, such as, e.g., the Soviet Union or the United States. In this respect, restricting minority rights to cultural matters, and protection from persecution shows little advance from the position of national minorities in the former Kingdom of Rumania between the two World Wars. How far the cultural rights of the large Hungarian minority in Transylvania are respected will now be considered.

ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES

Foremost among these is the redemarcation of regions and cities, thereby fragmenting the Hungarian population in such a way as either to reduce their majority or to convert it into a minority. The Hungarian autonomous province was created in 1952 by articles 19 and 20 of the constitution of that year. The total population of this province was, according to the 1956 census, composed of 77.3 percent Hungarians, 20.1 percent Rumanians, 0.4 percent Germans, 0.4 percent Jews, and 1.5 percent gypsies. In December 1960 a governmental decree modified the boundaries of the Hungarian autonomous province. Its whole southern part, which was predominantly Hungarian, was attached to Stalin province, which has now of course been renamed and is known as "Brasova." In place of this, several districts with an overwhelming Rumanian majority were joined to it from the southwest. This boundary adjustment reduced the Hungarian population by approximately 82,000 and increased the Rumanian population by approximately 131,000 out of a total population of just over half a million. The official reasons were to facilitate communications and administration, but the new name given to the freshly demarcated province echoes the real fact of the situation, viz. the substantial dilution of its Hungarian character. The province was no longer called the Hungarian autonomous province but the Mures-Hungarian autonomous province, after the River Mures.

The process of dilution was carried still further, though by less obvious methods, by the drive toward industrialization. The region adjacent to Hungary already had the highest rate of industrialization in the country but the program aimed at an overall stepping up, for the border regions of Transylvania as well as for the rest of the country. In a Socialist economy not only does in-

dustrialization mean the growth of the urban proletariat, but it also means the creation of a large industrial bureaucracy. In the process of stepping up the industrialization of industrial Transylvania, large numbers of civil servants, administrative staff, industrial bureaucrats, and workers of Rumanian nationality swelled the Rumanian population in the regions neighboring Hungary. In this case it is difficult to speak of a failure to respect the rights of the Hungarian minority. Industrialization with its consequent internal migration is a common enough feature of many societies. Where, however, there is an influx of a minority group and an exodus of a majority group the consequences for the culture of the majority group are important enough if the matter stops there. Many young Hungarians are obliged to leave Transylvania in search of work in the territories to the south and southeast of Transylvania, which are known as Old Rumania. And, it should be observed, the matter does not remain there, as will be shown later in this article.

There is another technique which frequently conceals de facto discrimination beneath a facade of general applicability. Whether or not the famous law No. 261 of April 4, 1945, and decree No. 12 of August 13, 1945, did in fact discriminate against Hungarians, its provisions certainly weighed very heavily on Hungarians who had Rumanian citizenship. This law provided that all persons who served in military or paramilitary organizations of a state having been at war with Rumania lost their Rumanian citizenship. Decree No. 12 fixed the operative date for such service as after August 22, 1944. For practical purposes this meant that the Hungarian minority would lose their Rumanian citizenship. The circumstances were that Rumania joined the Allies against the Axis Powers in 1944, while Hungary was under German occupation and on the Axis side until the end of the war in May 1945. The northern and predominantly Hungarian part of Transylvania was given back to Hungary in 1940 by the Germans and Italians and under the Hungarian regime of Horthy all adult males were obliged to enlist for military service and youths were required to join young people's paramilitary organizations. Through these circumstances few Hungarians escaped the threat of losing their nationality. It was provided that joining the Communist Party would save them from losing it.

DISCRIMINATION IN THE CULTURAL FIELD

The steps taken by the Rumanian authorities to weaken Hungarian culture are again in some cases mixed with what might be merely part of the general Communist policy. Thus, for example, both Catholic and Protestant churches were deprived of their schools; this in itself was merely part of the normal materialistic and secular policy of a Communist State and as such, although it struck a particularly severe blow at Hungarian culture, it was not discriminatory. But there was also a widescale destruction of centuries-old Hungarian private or public archives and libraries, and the devastation of old Hungarian castles to provide stone material for new buildings. Vital links with the past were thereby wiped out.

Until 1958, a large-scale educational system, from the primary to the university level, flourished in Hungarian. Since then, however, the situation has changed rapidly. The number of Hungarian primary schools is steadily dwindling and a decree now in force authorizes only the eldest of a family to send children to study in a Hungarian language school. At the level of higher education the Rumanian authorities introduced a system of "parallel sections." This meant that in such an institution a parallel Rumanian curriculum with Chairs held by Rumanians were introduced. When this cuckoo in the nest was big enough it took over the whole nest and the Hungarian section disappeared.

Another method which helped in cutting down instruction in the Hungarian language was for the student body and the teaching staff of the institutions concerned to announce that for practical considerations and in accordance with their desire to perfect themselves in "the beloved Rumanian mother-tongue" they had decided to combine with a Rumanian-language institution, or in the case of a bilingual institution to go over entirely to Rumanian. This process was carried so far that even student hostels felt its impact. Hungarian students asked to share a room with a Rumanian in order to perfect their knowledge of Rumanian. At the present time the medical school in the capital of the Mures-Hungarian autonomous province is undergoing "parallelization." For Hungarian academic establishments there is now a limited admission quota. In 1958, the Hungarian University in Cluj, Bolyai University, fused with the Rumanian University of Babes. The fusion was marked by the suicide of three of the professors at Bolyai University.

Certain facets of this process in isolation could be laudable. For example, it is an excellent language training to share a room with someone speaking a different language, but the whole pattern of cutting down Hungarian-language instruction in an area which is or was so Hungarian that it was a part of Hungary for almost 900 years cannot be reconciled with respect to the constitutional rights of the Hungarian minority and is by no means explicable as part of the normal process of shaping a Communist society. For centuries Hungarian culture and tradition have taken deep root and survived the vicissitudes of fortune, both kindly and outrageous. It is difficult to conceive that a people so deeply rooted in its culture would itself clamor for the destruction of that culture by absorption into the Rumanian mainstream.

A further instrument for the dilution of the Hungarian majority in Transylvania is the resettlement of Rumanian refugees coming from Bessarabia. Their reintegration into Rumanian economic and social life has taken place mainly in Transylvania, where they constitute a large part of the labor force in the industrial development from the western belt neighboring Hungary to the heart of the Mures-Hungarian autonomous province, and they are settled mostly in cities where the proportion of the Hungarian population is still high, e.g., in Cluj, the capital of Transylvania.

The Rumanian National Statistical Office carried out a census in 1956 and it was emphasized that the civil servants carrying out the census were obliged to call attention in each case to the basic difference between nationality, i.e., ethnic origin, and mother-tongue. All persons registered had to state to which national ethnic group they belonged. The distinction between national group and mother-tongue and the obligation to state before officials one's national group drive a wedge between a people and its culture and this indeed is reflected in the figures given by the census. For every 1,000 people of declared Hungarian origin there were 1,042 giving Hungarian as their mother-tongue. It is difficult to believe that Hungarian, difficult and almost unrelated to other languages, is the mother-tongue of any but Hungarians, and yet 4.2 percent of the Hungarian minority group stated from statistics that they were Hungarian. The reasonable conclusion to be drawn from this is that in their eyes it was better not to declare oneself to be Hungarian. The more innocent explanation of gross inefficiency in the compilation of the census would seem to be negated by the deliberate distinction drawn by officials where no real distinction exists.

Too many individual items which could be capable of other explanations than discrimi-

nation if taken singly point unmistakably when viewed as a whole toward a pattern of conduct. In short, as far as the Hungarian people in Rumania are concerned, they appear in the give and take of living together to lose on both the awings and the roundabouts. When this happens to a minority group it is difficult to resist the conclusion that they are being subjected to discrimination.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, many writers and statesmen have clearly described for us the specific data on the administrative, economic, cultural, and linguistic persecution of the basically anti-Communist Hungarian minority in Transylvania. I might add that suppression of cultural life is also taking place, as only recently the Transylvanian Hungarian Writers Union was merged with the Rumanian Writers Union and even in the Hungarian Theater at Marosvasarhely—Tirgu Mures—Rumanian plays were mostly performed in 1964.

We all realize that true ideological co-existence and friendship with Rumania will not be possible as long as the Communist Gheorghiu-Dej regime exists. Freedom is a commodity missing in the Rumanian life despite the sanctimonious and only partially kept promises of the Government to the State Department last year about amnestying the political prisoners. To this day, Communist sources mention the release of 10,000 prisoners, certainly less than the total number incarcerated during the Stalinist period and in the wake of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Interestingly, however, Hungarian sources in America only know of 67 specific cases where a Transylvanian Hungarian, imprisoned by the Communist regime, has been freed.

We should not give up our right to demand democratization of the regime and ultimately free elections before we throw several hundred millions of dollars that will only further upset our balance of payments, to the wolves in sheep clothes in Bucharest. We should remember that several Democratic platforms and all Republican platforms during the past 17 years were committing the administration, be it Republican or Democratic, to the cause of peaceful liberation of Eastern Europe.

However, at the present time we have made agreements with Rumania and we are implementing them both by direct aid and by allowing our private enterprises to export industrial machinery and know-how to Rumania. By doing so, we are helping Rumania to proceed with its industrialization plans despite lessened Russian aid and Comecon cooperation. Thereby, however, we are also undermining the solidarity of the Western bloc on East-West trade, a serious step indeed which led to a crumbling of trade barriers in strategic goods between our adversaries and allies. France and lately Germany are following the example set by England in extending long-term credits to Communist nations, which in most cases equals gifts, as the Communists were never known to pay their debts after a few years; witness the lend-lease debt which they still owe us.

Under these circumstances, it becomes imperative to conduct the economic and cultural relations with the Gheorghiu-

Dej regime under the auspices of realistic bargaining and quid pro quo. The Johnson administration cannot escape the responsibility to promote American interests and the interests of freedom and human rights in negotiating with the Gheorghiu-Dej regime. Therefore, it is necessary to remind those who think that East-West trade will be the panacea to world peace and balance-of-payments difficulties and that internal differences with Moscow must absolve the Communist satellite regime from too close a scrutiny, that we cannot condone their repressive actions and must try to lessen or abolish them by using our economic leverage.

More particularly in the case of Rumania we must insist upon a cessation of political repression and economic scattering of the Hungarian minority. While we have only a limited influence over any Communist regime no matter what difficulties it might have with Khrushchev and his successors, it would not be impossible to insist upon conditions which are laid down in the United Nations Charter and the Rumanian Communist Constitution of 1952. Observation of these conditions would include:

First. Restoration of the right of freedom of movement to professionals in Rumania. This provision would also restore the right of professionals to change their present assignments for a new one which brings them closer to their home area or nationality region. The same provision should be applied also to technical personnel and skilled workers if assignments are available in their own nationality areas.

Second. A promise by the Rumanian Government not to use American funds, or American plants received for the furthering of Rumanization of Hungarian or German areas. Such a provision is not unusual, as we have asked even NATO allies not to use NATO military aid for certain purposes and financial checks were added to many foreign aid sums to other countries.

Third. Release of all political prisoners, including those belonging to the Transylvanian Hungarian minority by the set deadline June 30, 1965—this deadline was promised by the Rumanian Government in last May.

Fourth. Reopening of the merged Hungarian educational institutions, especially on high school and college level, including the Bolyai University and the college at Nagyenyed—Aiud. Also cessation of the parallelization where it does not now exist.

Fifth. Expansion of the elementary schools of the Hungarian minority, giving the opportunity to Hungarian parents outside of the autonomous province to send their children into Hungarian and parallelized schools rather than into Rumanian ones.

Sixth. Restoration of the Hungarian Writers Union and other cultural clubs like the libraries of Gyulafehervar—Alba Julia—and Nagyenyed—Aiud—to the Hungarian minority.

Seventh. Permission by central and local authorities of the use of the Hungarian language in public both within

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and without the autonomous province in Transylvania.

Eighth. The reinstallation of the heroic Hungarian Catholic bishop of Gyulfehervar—Alba Julia—Aron Marton to his see and restoration of some Catholic and other denominational schools for the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, and preferably a new settlement with the various churches, including the Vatican.

Ninth. A reattachment of the districts of Haromszek—Trei Scaune—to the Mures Autonomous Province and restoration of the name Magyar Autonomous Province to the same. Also cessation of the constant replacement of local officials by Rumanians in this province, and numerical representation of Hungarians in the village and town councils in other Transylvanian areas.

Tenth. Free settlement rights of Hungarians in the cities.

Of course, even if all these reforms were implemented by the Gheorghiu-Dej, it would not make his state a democracy as long as free elections would not show the real sentiments and opinions of the people. But we as Americans would have contributed our share to lessening the cross of double persecution from the Hungarian minority in Transylvania; and the administration would have at least a plausible explanation for its actions toward helping a Communist state.

Many people will say that attaching conditions will slow down the Rumanian secession from the Communist bloc. I do not believe so. The Rumanians quarrel with Moscow partly because of their own national economic interests, but partly because they clearly realize that the Soviet-Chinese rift and the growing power of Western Europe and the United States leave them no other reasonable choice. And Rumanian history shows that their diplomats whatever their social and political background were reasonable and calculating men. They are hard bargainers, but they know the limits of their power and influence. It is up to the administration whether 3 years from now we will hear the administration admit that it had foolishly squandered its funds and licenses upon a hard-line Communist state or whether the Members on my side of the aisle will be proven wrong by a genuine change in Rumania. However, if we do not act for freedom of both Rumanians and Transylvanian Hungarians, we will be guilty not only of a grave omission but of betraying all the principles in which we, on both sides of the aisle profess to believe as Americans. And let it not be said that someone did not warn us beforehand.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, I join with my colleague in expressing dismay at the discrimination being practiced against the Hungarian minority in Rumania today. This Nation, founded on freedom and equality for all, abhors discrimination wherever practiced whether at home or abroad.

There is documented proof that Rumania discriminates against the Hungarian minority in the educational, cultural, economic, linguistic, and administrative fields. In the 1947 peace treat-

ies with the Allied Powers, Rumania agreed to grant to all under her jurisdiction the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination as to race, sex, language, and religion. Inasmuch as Rumania has not lived up to her agreements, I believe it behooves us to take a stand before the world in opposition to this discrimination.

Because of my conviction that this body should interest itself in the plight of the Hungarian minority in Rumania, I am today joining with many of my colleagues in sponsoring a resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives of the United States that discriminatory measures of the Rumanian Government be condemned.

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, the mistreatment the Hungarian minority in Rumania receive has long been a subject of grave concern to me as it should be to all freedom-loving people everywhere. Unfortunately, it is not a subject which has received the attention it deserves by our Government.

The Hungarian minority in Rumania suffers today largely because of its demonstrations in support of the Hungarian revolt which took place in Hungary in 1956. While not openly revolting, the unrest displayed in 1956 was not forgotten by the Gheorghiu-Dej regime which quickly became convinced that the Hungarians living in Rumania were not to be relied upon.

The subtle genocide that is being pursued against the Hungarian minority, still about 1.65 million strong, is a double persecution—one on the ethnic level and one on the ideological level—and should be recognized and condemned by the United States as such.

If we are to encourage limited Rumanian independence from Moscow by economic concessions, as we are apparently doing, we should demand some concessions in return and the concessions should be directed toward preserving the human rights of the Hungarian minority which is suffering so greatly under that Communist regime.

Mr. Speaker, U.S. funds should not be used to further repress those Hungarians who, in 1956, showed themselves to be our friends and have, as a result, incurred Communist and Communist-Rumanian displeasure alike.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may be permitted to extend their remarks in the Record on the subject I have just discussed.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
March 24, 1965 Pgs. 5604, 5605

CONDEMNATION OF DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES OF THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY

(Mr. PATTEN (at the request of Mr. ADAMS) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Speaker, it is with great pleasure that I join the gentleman from New York [Mr. HALPERN] and other colleagues, in cosponsoring today the resolution which condemns the discriminatory practices of the Rumanian Government against the Hungarian minority.

The charge of discrimination is always a serious one, for it reflects on the character of a person, or country, indicating a lack of reason. Therefore, great care should be exercised in making such a charge.

But the charge of discrimination by the Rumanian Government against the 1,650,000 Hungarians in that country has been substantiated.

The International Commission of Jurists has reported the occurrence of many cases of discrimination by the Government of Rumania.

There is more evidence.

In a comprehensive and disturbing article, "Trouble Over Transylvania," George Bailey wrote the following in the Reporter in November 1964:

This spring, Rumanian authorities announced their intention to demolish the his-

toric church of St. Lajos, which they characterized as an eyesore.

The article points out that "to prevent this, several thousand Hungarians took up a day and night vigil for more than a week."

Religious discrimination is not the only kind of prejudice against the Hungarians in Rumania.

Bailey also wrote about cultural discrimination:

The greatest single source of irritation to the Hungarians is the state cultural agreement with Rumania. Strict Rumanian application of the terms of the agreement has prevented the Hungarian Government from any sort of cultural link between the homeland and the minority.

In addition, there are restrictions against Hungarian citizens who are tourists.

And because every dictatorship fears enlightenment of the people, the Rumanian Government even extends its discrimination to the written word.

According to the article in the Reporter magazine:

There were 32 Hungarian newspapers in prewar Rumania; today there is 1.

These are only a few reasons why the House should pass this resolution.

By doing so, the world would know of the discrimination going on in Rumania and expose that Government's policy. With the heavy weight of the free world applying pressure, perhaps this discrimination would be diminished and eventually end.

46

FBI

Date: 4/27/65

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-69260)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (105-8223)

Re Chicago letter dated 4/9/65.

On Sunday, 5/2/65, the Polish-American Congress will hold its annual anniversary commemoration of the Polish Constitution of May 3, 1791. It has been reported that Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY will deliver a speech at the celebration and review the parade that is held in conjunction with it. The main address in the Polish language will be given by General STANISLAW MACZEK of Edinburgh, Scotland, who during World War II commanded the First Armored Division of the Polish Armed Forces in exile which assisted in the liberation of Holland from German occupation. Governor OTTO KERNER of Illinois and Mayor RICHARD J. DALEY of Chicago will also speak as well as CHARLES ROZMAREK, President of the Polish-American Congress.

As the Bureau is aware, the celebration of the Constitution of May 3, 1791 is an annual affair of great importance to free Poles and the Chicago rally is generally attended by around 100,000 persons who march from the center of the Polish community to Humboldt Park where they lay a wreath on the statue of General THADDEUSZ KOSCIUSZKO, the

- 3 - Bureau (RM)
- 1 - New York (Info) (RM) UDE
- 1 - Washington Field (66-2479 Sub J) (Info) (RM) 17 APR 28 1965
- 3 - Chicago

1 - 105-8489

1 - 105-15769

WED: m

(8)

Classified by 26 12/1/74
 Exempt from GDS Category 223
 Date of Declassification Indefinite

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 26 12/1/74
 Exempt from GDS Category 223
 Date of Declassification Indefinite

M P

46

CG 105-8223

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Polish hero who fought on the side of the colonies in the American Revolution and then returned to Poland to lead her valiant but futile effort against final partition by Russia, Prussia and Austria in 1795. (U)

[REDACTED] has reported that on Sunday, 5/2/65 at the same time that this Polish rally is being held the Russian-American Old Settlers Club is holding a 20th anniversary celebration of the end of World War II. This celebration is being held at the Russian Cultural Center, some six blocks from the center of Humboldt Park where the General KOSCIUSZKO Monument is located. As the Bureau is aware, several of the officers of the Russian-American Old Settlers Club are Communist Party (CP) members. (U)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(C)
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TELETYPE

EX 116

END 78D

CONFIDENTIAL

URGENT

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Wallace
- 1 - Mr. White
- 1 - Mr. Stokes

TO SAC CHICAGO (105-8223)
FROM DIRECTOR FBI (65-69260) 26

REURAIRTEL APRIL TWENTY-SEVEN NINETEEN SIXTY FIVE PROPOSING
A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MOVE IN CONNECTION WITH EVENTS TO BE HELD
IN CHICAGO ON SUNDAY MAY TWO NINETEEN SIXTY FIVE. AUTHORITY GRANTED.
INSURE NO CONNECTION OF BUREAU NOTED WITH PROPOSED PUBLICITY. U
ADVISE BUREAU PROMPTLY OF RESULTS. U

BST:gow
(8)
NOTE:

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED
SLIP(S) 37 Classification
4977 1/4/68

NR 307625
ENC 14

See cover memorandum Branigan to Sullivan, dated 4-29-65,
aired by BST:gow, same caption.

Classified By 6080 EWR
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

JUN 13 1977

VIA TELETYPE
1 PR 30 1965
12:48 PM mll
ENCIPHERED

DELETED
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE REC'D - 2017 AM

MAY 11 1965

Classified By 6136 1-11/74
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 4-29-65

FROM : Mr. W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

1- Mr. Belmont
1- Mr. Sullivan
1- Mr. Branigan
1- Mr. Wallace
1- Mr. White
1- Mr. Stokes

Collins
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

This sets forth proposal by the Chicago Office under this program and recommends Chicago's proposed course of action be approved. U

DETAILS:

On Sunday, 5-2-65, the Polish-American Congress will hold its annual anniversary commemoration of the Polish Constitution of May 3, 1791. Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey reportedly will make a speech and review the parade. Main address in Polish language to be given by General Stanislaw Maczek, World War II commander, who participated in the liberation of Holland from German occupation. The Governor of Illinois and Mayor of Chicago will also speak as well as President of the Polish-American Congress. Celebration of the Constitution of 1791 is an annual affair of great importance to free Poles and Chicago rally is generally attended by approximately 100,000 persons

65-69260

BST:gow

(7)

Enclosure

EX 105

Classified by REF-20

Exempt from GDS

Date of Declassification

CONTINUED

Classified by 453

Exempt from GDS

Date of Declassification

Category 3

Declassification Index

VER

3/4/77

Category 3

Indefinite

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan

3:

5-65265

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OBSERVATION:

It is believed the above proposal is ready-made for action under our Counterintelligence Program. No embarrassment can be foreseen to the Bureau if subject is handled through established press contact. No embarrassment can be foreseen to Vice President Humphrey as a result of the proposed course of action.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, attached is teletype to Chicago approving its proposed course of action.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/27/65

AIRTEL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-120113)
FROM: SAC, WFO (105-53440) (P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In addition to the information set out in the LHM,
the informant furnished the following information to SA
[REDACTED] on 4/28/65:

[REDACTED]

AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF
DATE

- 1 - Bureau (Enc. 6) (1 - 105-120113) (1 - 65-69269)
- 1 - New York (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 1 - WFO (1 - [REDACTED]) (1 - 105-2475-1025)

WAC:jhr
(10)

66 MAY 10 1965

Classified by 6-136 17411
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NOT RECORDED
183 MAY 3 1965
Classified by 5632
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN

105-120113-263

IAH/nlh
(6)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES

FOR INFORMATION
DATE 4-20-57 11:27
62

NOT RECORDED
150 APR 20 1965

Classified
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

60 MAY

5-77644

COPIES

57

where it had been
traffic since Monday.

Cop Is Curious

By Thursday it had accumulated
no tickets on the windshield and
patrolman investigated the ve-
cle for ownership.

Witnesses said the cop opened
the door, peered in the glove com-
partment, pulled out more than
a tickets, examined a gas credit
card made out to Leonid, turned
unpolicemanly white, thrust

Call to Murtagh

The Traffic Summons Control
Board said that it could disclose
the exact ticket tally only with
permission of Chief Criminal
Court Judge John M. Murtagh.

A phone call to his office el-
cited an alarmed comment from
his secretary: "You're not going
to get us mixed up with those
diplomats, are you?"

Reluctantly, she reached the
judge, and he said he had looked



Leonid A. Gouliev
Claims diplomatic immunity

into the matter. Murtagh found
out — 48.

Leonid's car bears the license



(NEWS foto by Jack Clarity)

Passerby takes look at ticket on Gouliev's car yesterday.

number of 8C6707, and Murtagh
wanted to know why he didn't
have diplomatic plates.

Absent for Holiday

We'll try to find out after the
holiday.

Leonid wasn't available at the
Soviet mission headquarters 136
E. 67th St., yesterday because of
the holiday, a spokesman said.
You know, May Day. Leonid
started celebrating early.



Classified By 6080
Date of Declassification
Category 3
Date of Review

MAY 5 1965

by deep cover agents or Russian nationals who are smuggled into the country with false identities.)

The diplomats, said Dr. Stukenbroeker, are interested in everything and frequently pass themselves off as American businessmen. He told this story of one.

The photographer called the FBI, Dr. Stukenbroeker said, and within hours the man was identified as an attaché of the

check some of it at the cloak room, and when they left they had 25 pounds of literature.

Classified by 6886
Exempt from GDS, Category 1
Date of Declassification 5/26/77
Indel

NOT RECORDED
13 1965

New York Herald Tribune _____
New York Journal-American _____
New York Daily News _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Baltimore Sun _____
The Worker _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
People's World _____
Date _____

MAY 7 1965

54

100

- (2) - Bureau
- 1 - Chicago (Info) (RM)
- 1 - New York (Info) (RM)
- 2 - [REDACTED]

EX 105

65-12214-39

JEN:feb 2 1965

REC-1 15 MAY 20 1965
Classified by 717-62-13
Exempt from GDS, Category 1
Date of Declassification Indefinite

(6)

Classified by 1-17-74
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

55

11
Classified by 67
Date of Declassification
Intelligence or going on trial and facing a very possible death sentence.

The Soviet General said that ABEL held firmly and did not give way to any luring talk, although different means of persuasion were used to drag a confession from him on his intelligence work. It was stated that during ABEL's trial he showed integrity, profound love of country, faithfulness to duty, moral purity, courage and staunchness.

ENCLOSURE

REC-116

- 65-61601-33
2 - Bureau (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - New York

HEM:chm
(3)



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(Q)

instrumental in negotiating the
exchange between Abel and
Powers. Powers was held as a
prisoner of the Cubans after his 112

100-107260-33
ENCLOSURE

58

Classified by 3732 600 EWK
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
3/22/78 527-77

JCS:hrt
(4)

MAILED 8
COMM-FBI

Classified by 6136 12/14
Exempt from GDS, Category 283
Date of Declassification Indefinite

- Tolson _____
- DeLoach _____
- Mohr _____
- Wick _____
- Casper _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- Felt _____
- Gale _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

59

in Wroclaw on March 14, 1965, General Berling outlined word for word the goals of this commission as follows:

"...We foresee....the organization of annual celebrations of great historical events, of battles waged by Polish soldiers in defense of Polish and humanitarian ideals, the exchange of delegations, the exchange of historical information and documents, verification of military ranks during the last war, care of places where Polish blood was spilled during the war, commemorating these places by designating monuments or by other similar expressions. We will try to organize an exchange of periodicals and publications, containing reliable information; excursion trips, visits of emigres' families in Poland; summer visits of children from abroad to Poland and so forth.'

ENCLOSURE

NR W40 kt 6/4/65

60

all, this is the person responsible for the death of Boleslaw Scibiorek, the former head of the Civilian Struggle in the Lodz area, who subsequently became second secretary of the PSL (translator's note: Polish Peasant Party), and was assassinated in Lodz on December 5, 1945. This is Moczar's well-known past and his present position does not evoke confidence in him. Such a discredited person being placed at the head of this program constitutes a communist blunder. Moczar says he wants to help emigres to establish contact with Poland and to visit Poland, whereas Berling calls for excursions and for emigre families to visit Poland. How does this look in practise? Namely thus; that Moczar, who controls all emigration to and out of Poland, recently introduced a new form for issuance of a visa to Poland in which there are twenty-four questions instead of fifteen. I have it in my hand, along with a form for the issuance of a Soviet visa, which scarcely contains twelve questions.

Italy and so forth. He cannot go without a visa only to Poland, the country from which he came. Not until visas are cancelled can there be any important proof of good-will by Moczar.

"And what would you call the recent step taken by him of filming letters exchanged between Poland and the West? Heretofore correspondence of persons placed on special suspected lists was controlled and the others were selected only at random. Now, the substance of every letter is recorded. Such control, according to Moczar's words, 'helps emigres in establishing contacts'--but not with Poland, only with the security service, camouflaged in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. If Moczar truly wants emigre reconciliation with Poland, then let him eliminate

contacts with Poland? 'After all, this is the next largest Polonia after the United States, which has no organization, and we can only surmise as to its number. For this Polonia to have rapprochement with Poland, even though arranged by the communist regime, would be a great experience and a source of great happiness to it. And if, according to these Soviet statistics, 53,000 members of this Polonia reside in Kazakhstan, then they are those who were deported during the war, to whom the Polonia Commission has an obligation to bring back to Poland.

"Moczar's action in concentrating on Polonia in western countries and turning his back on Polonia in Soviet Russia can be interpreted only by one way, namely; that it is not a question of rapprochement by Polonia with Poland in general, but only of infiltration of Polonia in western countries in order to change its negative attitude toward the Polish regime to a positive one.


This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions
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your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Group 1~~
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Classified by 3878
Exempt from GDS, category 3
Date of declassification 3/22/97

NR NY a/t 6/9/65
ENCLOSURE

65-67160
ENCLOSURE 105



- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66

ORIGINAL

3-Durou (Enc.1)
3-WFO
(1-134-6237)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT RECORDED
162 JUN 28 1965

JEF/JaJ
(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by 162
Exempt from GDS, Category 2+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Classified by 162
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

6 JUL 6 1965

67

the FBI and the State Department
in order to determine if the
disclosure outside your jurisdiction

-2-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NR WFO let 6/28/65

68

for future exploration by mankind. From this program...we will learn much about how to alter and control the tremendous energy developed through the interaction of the air and the sea...

It remains for us now to put this knowledge to work and...economically extract the resources from the sea for our use. Before we can fully apply this knowledge, however, we must learn how to live, work and operate in the ocean depths. Without this capability we cannot effectively use the ocean space for our country's defense, or make available its vital materials..."

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Confidential

Classified by 7830
Exempt from GDS Category 1
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NR 040 let 6/29/65 ENCLOSURE

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF 7/16
DATE 8-13-77

NOT RECORDED
183 MAY 25 1965

~~Classified by 6136 2/5/74 2 2 6080~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2 3 3~~
~~Date of Declassification indefinite indefinite indefinite~~
~~3/1/77 EWK 5277~~

CONFIDENTIAL

70

these professions; to disseminate knowledge and understanding of the marine sciences, and to provide liaison between the many disciplines, government, and industry; to advance and foster the development of the tools for exploration, research and protection of the world's marine resources; and to provide those services which will create better understanding of the relevance of the marine sciences to other technologies, arts, and human affairs.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

NR Wt 1st 7/2/65

to offer little chance of embarrassment to this Bureau. U

The above suggestion is, of course, embryonic in character and needs further development and clarification before it could be implemented. Nevertheless, it offers definite potential and NY believes that it should be given serious consideration. Accordingly, Newark is requested to review and offer observations and, in addition, submit any other suggestion which they might, in turn, develop. U

NR NY 7/7/65

²
X

Not Rec'd 7/7/65
172

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Bureau and interested offices were cognizant of the proposals of WFO which the Bureau has seen fit to disapprove; hence no comment is being made on those matters in this letter. ✓

WFO will continue to furnish cointelpro aggressive action. ✓

- 1-4
- 2 - Bureau (RM)
 - 1 - Chicago (105-8223)(INFO)(RM)
 - 1 - Washington Field (66-2479)(INFO)(RM)
 - 1 - New York

HAB:cag
(5)

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category A3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
11/27/74

REC-117

65 69260-45

JUL 21 1965

~~SECRET~~

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



94

SAC, WFO (66-2479)

July 30, 1965

Director, FBI (65-69260)

REC-122

EX-101

SECRET

COINTELPRO

ReNYlet 7-19-65.

Any information regarding the contemplated use of the document should be first brought to the attention of the Bureau.

- 1 - Chicago (105-8223)
- 1 - New York (65-23622)

BST-bjs (8)

NOTE: bjs

Reviewed

Classified By 6080 Euk

Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEP 22 1977

New York calls attention to article appearing in New York Times 7-4-64 concerning the "economic lead which the US currently maintains over the Soviet Union." This article reported on a study made public by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress and was entitled "Current Economic Indecisions for the USSR." It is a detailed analysis of the latest Soviet economic statistics prepared for the Joint Economic Committee by a number of veteran American analysts of Soviet economy working under the direction of Leon Herman, Library of Congress.

MAILED 6

JUL 30 1965

COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

Classified by 6130

Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

AUG 9 1965

NY 105-66554

It should be noted that the subject has been having prolonged lunch periods (two hours) at home. The possibility exists that the subject may do his drinking there.

was contacted and a hypothetical case regarding a person who takes Miltown or other drugs and what effect this would have on the physical condition was discussed. [redacted] advised that from the limited information available, it was possible that a person who takes from six to eight tablets of Miltown or other similar-type drugs a day could develop a glassy appearance in the eyes and have the appearance of being in a dream and staring all the time. He also advised that some drugs cause a dryness that would necessitate a person's consuming a large quantity of liquid to alleviate this discomfort.

NR NY 6/30/65

NY 105-66554

~~TOP SECRET~~

It should be noted that SAs of the FBI have observed subject on numerous occasions at close hand and he seems to be oblivious to his surroundings. He also seems to have a fixed stare. *on 6-4-65*

Chinese
[redacted] subject was observed entering a local restaurant and having lunch. Subsequent to his leaving, inquiry was made in this [redacted] restaurant and it was determined that subject did not consume any alcoholic beverages with his dinner. U

[redacted] S
These observations on subject are being made by the NYO in order to point out the areas where a weakness on the part of the subject may exist. U

TOP SECRET

-3-

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-69260)

DATE: 7/27/65

FROM : SAC, WFO (66-2479)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO
[REDACTED]

W Re NYlet, 6/29/65. U

Re NYlet recommended WFO, at the Library of Congress, borrow recordings of conversations in American Indian languages that are extinct or rapidly becoming extinct. U

Inquiry at the Recorded Sound Section of the Library of Congress has determined that the Library of Congress does not record, collect, or have in its possession recorded conversations in American Indian languages. The only recordings of American Indian languages maintained by the library are musical. U

18
DOWNGRADED

Classified By 6080 Euk

Exempt from GDS, Category 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEP 2 1977

REC 12

- 65-69260-46
- ② Bureau
 - 1- Chicago (105-8223) (Info)(RM)
 - 1- New York (65-23622) (RM)(Info)
 - 1- WFO

1 JUL 20 1965

WSJ:lr
(5)

Classified by 6136 APJ
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

11/2/72

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

78

AC, WFO (66-2479) **REC-123 EX-101**
Director, FBI (65-69260) - 4/6

August 9, 1965

~~SECRET~~

COINTELPRO

Reurlet dated 7/27/65, which noted the only recording of American Indian languages maintained by the Library of Congress are musical.

Bureau feels New York suggestion, as set forth in its letter 6/29/65, has merit under this program and believes the matter should be pursued in an effort to determine if such recordings might be available elsewhere.

WFO is requested to contact appropriate sources at the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, in an effort to determine whether such recordings might be available there. It is further suggested that, if none are available there, inquiries be made to determine whether or not such recordings might be produced through the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Bureau's use as suggested by New York.

Handle promptly and furnish Bureau results of your inquiries.

Reviewed

Classified By 6080 Euk
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

- 1 - New York (65-23622)
- 1 - Chicago (105-8223)

BST:esh (6)

SEP 2 1977

NOTE:

[REDACTED]

MAILED 8
AUG 11 1965
COINTELPRO
Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

Classified by 6162
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

7 AUG 11 1965

TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

11/27/74

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-69260)

DATE: 8/5/65

SAC, WFO (66-2479 Sub J)

SECRET

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO

ReWFOlet 7/7/65.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

They stated it would be necessary for them to discuss these needs with their respective Division heads after which they will initiate steps to determine qualified personnel and they will then contact WFO Agents in regard to the personnel they have tentatively selected to participate in the program.

The Bureau and interested offices will be kept advised of developments in this matter.

- 2-Bureau
- 2-Chicago (105-8223) (RM)
- 2-New York (105-23622) (RM)
- 1-WFO

RSK:MJB

(7)

REC-71

EX-113

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

35 AUG 6 1965

66 AUG 16 1965

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Reviewed by 6080
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
SEP 27 1977

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-69260)

DATE: 8/5/65

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (65-23622)

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ReNYlet, 6/29/65; WFOlet 7/27/65. U

ReWFOlet set forth information that there are no recordings of American Indian languages at the Library of Congress. U

Inquiry at the American Indian Institute, 432 Park Avenue South, NYC, indicates that a number of American Indian languages are taught at the University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, and the university may have Indian language records, but the institute suggested we contact the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of Interior, Washington, D.C., who will be able to tell us if there are existing recordings of American Indian languages. U

LEAD

WASHINGTON FIELD

Classified By 6080 Euk

Exempt from GDS, Category 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEP 22 1977

At Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Will attempt to locate suitable recordings of American Indian languages. If none are available, will ascertain through reliable sources at the Bureau of Indian Affairs, where we can locate a few Indians proficient in lesser used Indian languages and make our own recordings. U

REC-70
EX-100

14 AUG 9 1965

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
- 1 - Chicago (105-8223)(Info)(RM)
- 2 - Washington Field (66-2479)(RM)
- 1 - New York

DM:mfd
(8)

Classified By G136
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIRECTOR, FBI

AUG 10 1965

SAC, NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

[REDACTED]

ReNYlet to the Bureau, dated 7/9/65. U

[REDACTED] (protect identity by request), Veterans Administration Hospital, First Avenue and 24th Street, telephonically advised SA [REDACTED] that he recently was in conversation with [REDACTED] who recently arrived in the US and who knew [REDACTED] very well. He stated that he was informed by [REDACTED] that the subject is still in Bucharest and is not married to a Polish diplomat. U

[REDACTED] stated that his original sources of information concerning [REDACTED] was an elderly couple who have since returned to Rumania. He stated that this couple were friendly with the [REDACTED] and apparently they were misinformed. U

In view of the above information, the NYO is presently closing its case on the subject, [REDACTED] U

Classified by 613 AW
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

65-69260
100-3-10137
NOT RECORDED
102 AUG 12 1965

- 4 - Bureau (105-138038) (RM)
- 1 - New York (100-38104-34)
- 1 - New York (134-10686) (RM)
- 1 - New York (105-74599) [REDACTED]
- 1 - New York (105-72120) [REDACTED]
- 1 - New York (65-23622) [REDACTED]

REC-900
53 AUG 23 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-118038

Reviewed By 6080
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-131153)

8/11/65

SAC, NEW YORK (105-67966) (RUC)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I. Consideration:

Extensive consideration has been given by the NYO to the intelligence concept suggested by the Bureau and set forth in relet.

- 3-Bureau (RM)
(1-COINTELPRO)
- 3-Washington Field (RM)
(1-66-2479)
- 1-New York (65-23622) (COINTELPRO)
- 1-New York

JFM:dam
(8)

Classified by 6136 RB
Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NOT RECORDED
202 AUG 16 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

57 SEP 10 1965

Reviewed Classified By 6080
Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEP 22 1977

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-131153-51

SAC, San Francisco (105-13527)

8/16/65

Director, FBI (105-115645)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reurlet 7/28/65 with accompanying letterhead memorandum captioned as above which contains information furnished by [REDACTED] U

Enclosed herewith for your information is a copy of FBI identification record concerning one [REDACTED] Bufiles contain no identifying information concerning [REDACTED] U

Furnish results of your inquiry regarding [REDACTED] to Bureau with your observations for additional contact 65-6921 [REDACTED] with him.

Enclosure

FMG:mab

NOTE: (6)

NOT RECORDED
180 AUG 18 1965

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DUPLICATE YELLOW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 618614
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3, 11
Date of Declassification Indefinite 11/27/74

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-115645-15

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-69260)

DATE: 8/17/65

FROM : SAC, WFO (66-2479 Sub J)

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO

On 8/9/65, SA [redacted] of the Bureau Liaison advised WFO that ONI had designated Commander [redacted] and [redacted] (civilian) of ONI to handle Navy participation in above program.

On 8/12/65, SAs [redacted] and [redacted] of WFO met with [redacted] Investigations Dept. Counterintelligence Support Center [redacted], Security Policy Dept. and [redacted] of Investigations, all of ONI.

ONI representatives were receptive to the program and stated they would undertake a survey of personnel to locate qualified persons to use in this program. WFO will work closely with ONI in this regard and after the selection of the persons to be used, will interview those selected to determine the ones believed most qualified for this type of assignment. The briefing of the persons selected will be handled by WFO with ONI participating.

On 8/12/65, SAs [redacted] had an informal discussion with [redacted] of the USEB and he envisions no difficulty in the clearance of the material selected to be passed by the individual branch of the service.

- 2-Bureau
1-Chicago (105-8223) (Info) (RM)
2-New York (65-23622) (RM)
1-WFO

RSK:MJB
(6)

Classified By 0136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2B
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC-69

25 AUG 18 1965

57 SEP 9 1965

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Reviewed by 6080 and
Exempt from GDS, Category 2B
Date of Declassification Indefinite

WFO 66-2479 Sub J

On 8/16/65, SA [REDACTED] of the Bureau advised WFO that OSI had requested additional guide lines for selection of personnel and after receiving these, OSI will designate a field unit to handle OSI's participation in the program. WFO will initiate contact with OSI upon receipt of info re appropriate unit to contact. U

Bureau and interested offices will be kept advised of progress in this matter. U

8/19/65

~~SECRET~~

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-120113)

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-33440) (P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In addition to the information set out in the LHM, the informant furnished the following information to SA [REDACTED] on 8/13/65: *Reviewed*

⑤ - Bureau (Enc. 6)

(1-134-6879)

① - 65-69260

1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)

1 - New York (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)

3 - Washington Field

(1-134-2137 Sub A) (WF 1146-S)

(1-65-2479 Sub J) (CINTELPRO)

Classified By 6080 EWL
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
SEP 22 1977

65-69260
NOT RECORDED
12 AUG 27 1965

WFO:lna

(10)

ENCLOSURE

AIRTEL

Classified by G13612
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
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59 AUG 31 1965

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-120113-320



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105-33440

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

S

The COINTELPRO potential of this operation is receiving preferred attention and the Bureau will be promptly advised of all developments.

U

[REDACTED]

S

[REDACTED]

S

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

19



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Washington, D.C. 20535

August 19, 1965

~~SECRET~~

Title

Character

CZ

Reference : Memorandum dated and
captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities
are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable
information in the past.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

GROUP 1

- 4 -

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property
of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside
your agency.

Let to SAC, New York
RE: COINTELPRO
Bufile: 65-69260

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

It is desired that New York and WFO carefully consider the foregoing observations, and that the views and recommendations of indicated offices be promptly submitted to the Bureau. Do not attempt any course of action in regard to this matter without Bureau authority. U

NOTE:

[REDACTED]

SECRET

44 50

~~SECRET~~

9/11

8-21-65

AIRTEL

TO: SAC, WFO (66-2479 Sub J) (Enclosure)

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-69260) —

COINTELPRO

EX 105

52 Reviewed
Classified By 6080 EMB
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

The enclosure was furnished to the Bureau's Liaison representative on 8-13-65 by Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

1-1
Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

New York (65-23622) (Enc.)

JCS:hrt

(10) See memo Branigan to Sullivan 8-24-65, same caption, JCS:hrt.

Classified by G136
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

50 SEP 7 1965 TELETYPE UNIT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-69260)

DATE: 8/30/65

FROM : SAC, WFO (66-2479) (P)
(SUB J)

SUBJECT: COINTEL PRO

He advised that a limited amount of these copies may be available at the JEC or, if additional documents are needed, from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, at 55¢ per copy.

- ② - Bureau (Enc. 1)
- 2 - Chicago (105-8223) (Enc. 2) (RM)
- 2 - New York (65-23622) (Enc. 5) (RM)
- 1 - WFO

JJR:mtm
(7)

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

EX-101

25 AUG 31 1965

Classified by 6136
Exempt from GDS
Date of Declassification Indefinite
CONFIDENTIAL

1 SEP 9 1965

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

WFO 66-2479

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 8/23/65, [REDACTED] JEC, provided 10 copies of instant document stating this was all that was available at her office. She advised that additional copies could be obtained at the Government Printing Office if necessary. U

If the Bureau approves the proposal to utilize the documents and additional copies are desired by Chicago or New York, WFO will obtain at the GPO. WFO is maintaining two copies of these documents in this file. U

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

94

89th Congress }
1st Session }

JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT

CURRENT ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR THE U.S.S.R.

MATERIALS PREPARED FOR THE
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES



JUNE 1965

Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1965

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95

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NELSON D. MCCLUNG

DONALD A. WEASTER (Minority)

JUNE 23, 1965.

To Members of the Joint Economic Committee:

Transmitted herewith for the use of the Joint Economic Committee and other Members of Congress is a compilation of statistical materials and interpretative articles entitled "Current Economic Indicators for the U.S.S.R." These materials will make up a successor volume to last year's study on the same subject. They are made available to the members of the Joint Economic Committee as a continuation of the studies which appeared in December 1962 under the title "Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power."

The committee is grateful to the Government departments and organizations for their assistance, as well as to the individual scholars who prepared various sections of this volume, and to the Research Analysis Corp. for permitting its staff members to help us in the study.

It should be clearly understood that the materials contained herein do not necessarily represent the views of the committee nor any of its individual members.

WRIGHT PATMAN, *Chairman.*

JUNE 21, 1965.

HON. WRIGHT PATMAN,
*Chairman, Joint Economic Committee,
Congress of the United States, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Transmitted herewith is a compendium of statistical data and interpretative comment entitled, "Current Economic Indicators for the U.S.S.R."

This volume, which is a successor to the report on the same subject published in February 1964, reflects the committee's continuing interest in verifiable facts and scholarly interpretation of current economic developments in the U.S.S.R. These periodic statistical reviews, in turn, are intended to supplement the analytical materials published in the Joint Economic Committee's December 1962 study entitled, "Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power."

In light of our experience in publishing the 1964 volume, certain changes have been made in the present study, particularly in regard to the introduction of more narrative materials to go along with the statistical data presented in each chapter. In addition, the present volume includes an introductory essay summarizing the main findings of the component chapters.

The individual chapters of the present study were prepared for the committee by a number of professional experts in this field of research who have given generously of their valuable time and specialized

knowledge. The committee is indebted in particular to the following individual contributors for the praiseworthy job they have done:

James W. Brackett.
Stanley G. Brown.
Stanley H. Cohn.
Norton T. Dodge.
Murray Feshbach.

Ferdinand F. Pirhalla.
Seymour M. Rosen.
Timothy Sosnovy.
Joseph Watstein.

In this connection, the committee is most grateful to the following departments of the Government for having made their specialists available for this project: The Departments of Commerce; Agriculture; Health, Education, and Welfare; the Bureau of the Census; and the Library of Congress. For the same reason, the committee also wishes to express its gratitude to the Research Analysis Corp. of McLean, Va.; and the University of Maryland.

The present study was planned and coordinated by Leon M. Herman, senior specialist, Soviet economics, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, to whom the committee feels particularly indebted for the high standards and patience he has brought to the present undertaking.

The initial work on behalf of the committee staff was handled by William H. Moore, senior economist, and the subsequent supervision of the completion and editing of the volume was handled by John R. Stark, deputy director.

JAMES W. KNOWLES,
Executive Director, Joint Economic Committee.

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INTRODUCTION

THE SOVIET ECONOMY IN 1963

A. SLOWDOWN IN THE RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

1. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

The performance of the Soviet economy during 1963 was marked by a sharp decline in the overall rate of growth, a decline that was manifestly induced by the absolute drop in the output of the agricultural sector. The gross national product of the country; i.e., the indicator which measures the aggregate value of all goods and services, increased somewhat in 1963, but the advance amounted to an abnormally low rate of 2.6 percent, the lowest percentage of growth in recent Soviet history. Five years earlier, in 1958, the annual growth rate of the Soviet Union was 8.5 percent.

In terms of average rates of growth, as indicated in detail in chapter I of the present study, the U.S.S.R. has recently slipped from the second highest position among the leading industrial nations, after West Germany, to the fifth position, below that of France. More recently, since 1961, in fact, the Soviet Union has fallen behind the United States, as far as annual growth rates are concerned.

In dollar terms, the aggregate value of goods and services produced in the U.S.S.R. in 1963 has been calculated in the present study (in 1963 market prices) at \$265 billion, an amount equal to 46 percent of the gross national product of the United States. In regard to its overall output, in other words, the U.S.S.R. continues to hold its position as the second largest economy in the world. In per capita terms, however, its comparative position in 1963 was considerably lower; namely, just barely ahead of Italy, as shown below:

Comparative per capita dollar value of GNP, 1963

(In 1963 market prices)

United States.....	3,084
France.....	1,964
Germany (German Federal Republic).....	1,858
United Kingdom.....	1,803
U.S.S.R.....	1,178
Italy.....	1,107
Japan.....	907

2. INVESTMENT TRENDS

The steady decline in the tempo of economic expansion in the U.S.S.R. during the past 5 years may be traced, in large part, to a sharp drop in the rate of growth in the allocation of new capital investment. As measured by the broad indicator of "fixed investment," the annual rate of growth of new capital investment had been

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proceeding at an average of 10.8 percent during 1951-58. However, in the course of the subsequent 5-year period (1959-63) new capital was plowed into the economy at an incremental rate of 7.1 percent per annum. Moreover, for the most recent period, 1961-63, the investment effort slackened off still further, showing an annual average growth rate of only 4.7 percent; 6.7 percent if new housing is excluded.

In regard to investment, too, the year 1961 was something of a turning point in the recent economic history of the U.S.S.R. In that year, as shown in considerable detail in chapter IV of our study, a sharp decline began to manifest itself in the rate of growth of new construction activity which remained almost unchanged during the following 2 years. By comparison, it should be noted, the volume of construction grew at an annual rate of nearly 14 percent during 1956-60.

One major factor responsible for the low growth rates in industrial investment since 1961 has been the dislocation resulting from the recent well-publicized effort on the part of the political authorities to carry out a major shift in the industrial structure in favor of such "progressive," growth-inducing branches as the chemical, petrochemical, and electronics industries. Beyond that, however, the lower trends in investment growth of the past few years reflect the diversion of resources to other programs, including various research-intensive equipment, for the military establishment and for space exploration.

3. AGRICULTURE

The year 1963 also witnessed a serious depression in the level of agricultural output in the country. Grains were affected most adversely by a widespread incidence of dry weather, with the result that only 89.3 million metric tons of grain were harvested in 1963, as compared with 112 million tons produced in 1962. Wheat production, in particular, declined by 26.5 percent from the level of the preceding year.

In terms of yield, too, the Soviet farm economy performed poorly in 1963. In wheat, for example, the yield per acre amounted to 9.2 bushels, which is equal to 36 percent of the amount of grain produced per acre during the year in the United States; namely, 25.3 bushels.

The level of production of livestock commodities moved somewhat erratically in 1963. Owing to a severe shortage of feed, which induced distress slaughtering, meat went up slightly, while the output of milk and eggs moved downward at a moderate pace. In comparison with the level of output in the United States, production of the above four major livestock commodities showed the following proportions in 1963; pork, 56 percent; beef and veal, 40 percent; milk (cows), 92 percent; eggs, 45 percent.

4. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

The industrial sector of the Soviet economy also witnessed a notable decline in growth during the year 1963. Civilian production increased by 6.6 percent over the preceding year, the smallest increase of the postwar period. This marks the fourth consecutive year of annual rates of expansion of less than 8 percent. By comparison, as shown by the data below, the average annual increase in industrial output during the fifties was about 10 percent.

Ann

Total industry
Industrial in
Civilian man-
Nondurable

The pattern has been fairly recent 4-year branches of style of gro- ades. Accord- one 4-year for nondur- a third of in electronics, second 4-year.

There are the rate of begin with, ment and in- ment. A pa- pattern of ne- familiar new- also played- the availabl- effect may l- workweek fr- above, indus- preemption- expense of in-

As has ofte- increase in ca- has been acc- These two c- claimants up- the evidence- fense sector in- defense outla- 1960 and 196- has grown at-

In recent- print as to w- Soviet Union- in order to p- consumer goo- for this line- Party Chiefs-

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Annual rates of growth of civilian industrial output in the U.S.S.R.

	1956-59 average	1960-63 average
Total industry.....	9.7	7.0
Industrial materials.....	9.6	6.1
Civilian machinery, including electronics.....	12.4	11.5
Nondurable consumer goods.....	7.4	2.9

The pattern of growth in recent years, as may be expected, has been fairly uneven. By viewing developments over the two most recent 4-year periods it is possible to observe that the officially favored branches of industry continue to be maintained more or less in the style of growth to which they had become accustomed over the decades. Accordingly, the average annual rate of increase declined from one 4-year period to the other, as illustrated above, by nearly a half for nondurable consumer goods, while industrial materials lost about a third of its earlier growth rate. In the category of machinery and electronics, by contrast, the decline in the rate of growth during the second 4-year period was by less than 10 percent.

There are several factors that help to account for the slowdown in the rate of industrial growth in the Soviet Union after 1959. To begin with, as explained more fully in the chapters dealing with investment and industry, there has been a sharp decline in industrial investment. Apart from that, there has been a shift in the allocation pattern of new capital, a shift that has involved the assimilation of unfamiliar new technology. Lowered levels of output in agriculture have also played a part in the reduced expansion of industry by shrinking the available supply of industrial raw materials. Another negative effect may be traced to the reduction in the length of the average workweek from 46 hours in 1959 to 41 in 1961. In addition to the above, industrial developments have been affected adversely by the preemption of high quality resources by the military sector, at the expense of investment of new plant and equipment for civilian industry.

5. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

As has often been the case in the past, the sharp decline in the rate of increase in capital investment in the U.S.S.R., underway since 1960, has been accompanied by a conspicuous rise in defense expenditures. These two categories of expenditures have always been competing claimants upon the resources of the domestic economy. Judging by the evidence at hand, Soviet authorities have chosen to favor the defense sector in recent years. This is indicated by the fact that explicit defense outlays have risen by more than 10.5 percent per year between 1960 and 1963, from 9.3 to 13.3 billion rubles. In contrast, investment has grown at a rate of only 4.7 percent during the same 3-year period.

In recent months, the question has often been raised in public print as to whether the new leadership, which came to power in the Soviet Union in October 1964, is likely to reduce military spending in order to provide for a better supply of agricultural products and consumer goods in the domestic economy. The fact most responsible for this line of speculation has been the recent announcement by Party Chief Brezhnev that the Soviet Government will spend

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\$79 billion on the improvement of the agricultural economy during the next 5-year plan (1966-70).

While the Soviet leaders have understandably avoided making any direct commitment on so sensitive a subject as the pattern of resource allocation, they have, since their accession to power, assured the public that agriculture would be treated more generously than it had been in the past.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that an increase in the allocation of more capital to agriculture would make it necessary for the Soviet authorities to cut back on their defense expenditures. A close analysis of the new agricultural plan for 1966-70, as presented by L. Brezhnev to the Central Committee on March 24, 1964, points to the conclusion that the rulers of the U.S.S.R. can continue their present intense effort in the sphere of military and space research and development, as well as in the expansion and deployment of advanced weapons system, without serious concern over the possible adverse impact of this effort on the agricultural economy. The kind of resources that are required to inject a higher level of productivity into agriculture, e.g., tractors, trucks, farm machinery, construction equipment, etc., no longer play a critical role in the modern defense industry. If anything, a large diversion of production inputs of this kind into agriculture would tend to impose a serious burden on the conventional branches of heavy industry, i.e., the branches which are both producers and consumers of this kind of mass-produced equipment. Modern weapon systems, on the other hand, depend more for their support and expansion upon the newer industries equipped especially to produce electronics, automatic mechanisms, precision instruments, and hand-tooled missiles of various kinds. They require, in addition, highly trained scientists, design engineers, and unusually skilled technicians of the kind that would not be, in the foreseeable future, conceivably transferred to jobs in the mass production lines of the farm machinery and automotive industries.

6. CONSUMPTION LEVELS

It is important to bear in mind, however, that the absolute volume of new investment continues to be very high in the U.S.S.R. Only the rates of new increments in annual capital allocations have declined of late. In 1963, for example, the aggregate figure for new investment in the U.S.S.R., amounted to 42.2 billion rubles, an enormous sum that is fully equal, in dollars, to the amount allocated to investment in the United States, although total consumption in the Soviet economy is equal to only one-third of the value of goods and services consumed in this country. Inevitably, therefore, the large outlays which the Soviet Government makes annually on investment and defense reduces severely the fund of resources available for consumption by the population.

As compared with its own past, to be sure, per capita consumption in the U.S.S.R. has increased substantially in recent years. In 1963, for example, it had reached a level equal to 70 percent above that of 1950. This reflects an average increase of about 4 percent a year.

In comparison with the major Western nations, however, the U.S.S.R. has failed to make any dramatic progress within the past

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dozen years. Thus, for example, in 1963 per capita consumption in the U.S.S.R. amounted to less than 90 percent of that in Italy. In respect to this important indicator, in other words, its position relative to Italy remained the same as it was in 1950.

In comparison with the United States, too, the recent Soviet record in per capita consumption has made little tangible relative progress. True, in 1963 Soviet per capita consumption reached a level equal to about 30 percent of that in the United States, whereas in 1950 it amounted to some 20 percent of our level. However, most of the gain made by the U.S.S.R., relative to the United States level, was achieved by 1958. Since then, consumption per capita has grown at about the same rate in both countries.

Apart from the difference in the aggregate volume of consumption, as shown in the relevant chapter, there are a number of important differences in the pattern of consumption in the two countries.

To cite one prominent difference: The share of starchy staples (grain products and potatoes) continues to be distinctively large in the U.S.S.R. It was larger in fact in the Soviet Union in 1962 than in the United States more than a half century ago. In addition, as shown in some detail in section VIII of this report, consumption of food per capita in the U.S.S.R. remains unusually high relative to other consumer goods to this day, reflecting a familiar social phenomenon; namely, that in a country with a low level of earnings a large proportion of the personal income of the population is devoted to food expenditures. By comparison, nonfood products and personal services absorb a smaller share of the consumer ruble. In fact, per capita consumption in 1963 of most of these items in the U.S.S.R. amounted to little more than 15 percent of that in the United States.

Estimated stocks of consumer's durables at end of 1963

(Units per 1,000 persons)

	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R. as percent of United States
Sewing machines.....	132	135	98
Radios.....	190	974	20
Television sets.....	53	315	17
Automobiles.....	4	272	1
Refrigerators.....	23	268	8
Washing machines.....	86	216	17

Another distinctive feature of the Soviet pattern of consumption is the high level of consumption of state-provided services such as health and education. Their high priority in the allocation pattern reflects the fact that such services are regarded by the Soviet Government as falling under the heading of investment rather than consumption.

In housing, the improvements in the level of available space, relative to population, has slowed down in recent years. New additions of urban dwelling space in 1963 amounted to 77.4 million square meters, as against 82.8 in 1960. By way of comparison, living space per capita in the U.S.S.R. in 1963 amounted to approximately 20 percent of that available in the United States. In this respect, there was no measurable improvement since 1950.

7. POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY

Because of the severe wartime losses in population, actual as well as potential, the Soviet Union has also had to contend with a less favorable manpower situation in recent years. In 1963, employment outside of agriculture increased by 2 million persons, as compared with the addition of 4.2 million nonfarm wage earners made in 1961. As far as the growth of the labor force as a whole is concerned, the rate of new additions has declined as follows: from an average rate of 1.9 percent for the period 1950-58 to an average of 1.4 percent during the next 5 years (1958-63).

This downward trend reflects (a) the delayed effect of the low birth rate of the wartime period and (b) the absence of any perceptible slack for raising further still the high labor participation ratio of the Soviet population, which is already quite high.

Another setback to the Soviet drive for rapid economic growth came in the form of a slowdown in the advancement of labor productivity. In the earlier of the two periods, under review here, Soviet performance in the sphere of labor productivity growth ranked very high, just below that of Germany. Specifically calculated in chapter I of this study, the average rate of growth in Soviet labor productivity measured 5.0 percent per year during 1950-58. During the subsequent 5-year period, however, labor productivity in the U.S.S.R. advanced at a much reduced average rate; namely 3.1 percent. Thus, the deterioration in the growth rate of Soviet productivity performance was the most pronounced among the major economies compared in this report.

8. FOREIGN TRADE

In its commerce with other nations, the Soviet Union has maintained a fairly steady rate of expansion in recent years. Total trade turnover [exports plus imports] rose by 6 percent in 1963, reaching a level of \$14.3 billion. At that level it was equal to 35 percent of the dollar value of the foreign commerce of the United States. In comparison with the other major trading nations of the world, the U.S.S.R. now ranks fifth in line, behind France and slightly ahead of Canada.

Viewed over the past 10-year period, the annual value of Soviet foreign trade expanded by 150 percent; in part, at least, as a result of (a) the return of the U.S.S.R. to its traditional markets in Western Europe and (b) its more active involvement in commodity exchanges with the newly developing countries. Still, the strong preference for trading with other Communist nations remains in effect. In 1963, as in preceding years, 70 percent of all Soviet trade transactions were completed with trade partners within the Communist world.

B. THE SEARCH FOR HIGHER LEVELS OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

1. DISCONTENT OF THE LEADERSHIP

The loss of economic momentum during the past 3 to 5 years has produced a mood of serious self-examination among policymakers and economic experts alike in the U.S.S.R. By 1962, there was very little left of the buoyant optimism over economic prospects which pervaded official Soviet opinion during the mid-fifties.

Even before the shock of the depressed harvest of 1963 had spread through the society as a whole, Soviet leaders began to voice com-

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plaints about the qualitative and dynamic aspects of their production system. They have complained, in general, about the failure of their planners and managers to make more effective use of the vast array of economic resources at their disposal. They have complained, in particular, about the declining yield in added output from new capital investment; about the all-too-slow growth of labor productivity; about the neglect of modern branches and processes of production; about the general indifference among the nation's plant managers to new, better, and cheaper materials; about the general resistance to innovation at the enterprise level; and about the deep-seated bureaucratic tendency on all levels of operation to rely on established, routine methods of manufacturing and distribution.

In one of his memorable addresses dealing with the problem of economic planning, delivered in November 1962, former Premier Khrushchev gave vent, in great detail, to the long pent-up discontent of the party hierarchy with the level of efficiency in the Soviet economy. He was especially critical of the pervasive lethargy among Soviet planners, administrators, and plant managers with respect to new, more efficient ideas and processes in the country's industrial plant. He was beginning to wonder, he declared, "whether this proves our inability to utilize technical progress."

An important reason for the loss of self-confidence among Soviet economic authorities is the fundamental fact that the economy of the U.S.S.R. has been growing bigger but not better. About a decade ago, official Soviet spokesmen were wont to cite as evidence of a considerable potential reserve for their own economic progress the fact that the country's industrial labor force was still well below its optimal size. Now, however, this particular reserve has been exhausted. Industrial employment in the U.S.S.R. is now beyond the proportion once considered optimal by Soviet economists; namely, 8 to 10 percent of the country's total population. In 1963, in fact, Russia's industrial manpower numbered 25 million persons, i.e., a figure larger by 40 percent than the 18 million that make up the industrial labor force of the United States. Yet, even according to their own undocumented claim, Soviet industry turns out a total annual product that is 35 percent lower than the aggregate U.S. industrial output.

In short, the continued annual recruitment of ever more new labor numbers into industry does not seem to be sufficient to alter the lagging relative position of the U.S.S.R. as an industrial producer. If anything, the mechanical practice of feeding a maximum of additional labor into the favored branches of production has tended to minimize the pressure for more efficient methods of labor utilization and, therefore, to delay progress in the critical area of labor productivity.

These practical difficulties arising from the low efficiency of new capital and labor inputs have generated a widespread discussion among academic economists and economic administrators in the U.S.S.R. aimed at a thoroughgoing reform of existing economic policies and practices. This officially sponsored discussion has been consciously directed toward a search for higher standards of production efficiency. In practical terms, as recently explained by Premier Kosygin in his address of December 9, 1964, to the Supreme Soviet, this discussion is expected to result in the discovery of new ways and means of "obtaining maximum results at minimum expenditure of

labor and material, based on high labor productivity and a high scientific and technical standard of production." Unless a "substantial change for the better" is achieved in this regard, Kosygin warned, it will be impossible to attain the party's declared goal of "an increase in the rate of growth of the national economy and the channeling of more resources toward raising the well-being of the people."

2. PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC REFORMS

With the ouster of Khrushchev and the coming to power of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, public demand for economic reform in the U.S.S.R., which began in 1962, entered a new, more authoritative phase. The ideas that were presented in 1962 by a once obscure Kharkov professor and subjected at that time to widespread criticism, in the space of 2 years evolved to become the new orthodoxy of the post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership.

"We shall proceed toward planning on the basis of orders placed by consumers not only in industry producing consumer goods but also in other branches of the national economy." With these words, which were also addressed to the Supreme Soviet on December 9, 1964, Premier Kosygin announced the intention of the new Soviet leadership to adopt many of the very un-Marxian ideas that have come since 1962 to be associated with "Libermanism"—after Yevsey G. Liberman, professor of economics at the Kharkov Engineering-Economics Institute.

Liberman's main idea, which was first aired in Pravda in September 1962, affirms that the preparation by the central planners of detailed assignments to be executed without question by the industrial enterprises tends to hamper rather than help the latter in their basic effort to satisfy the needs of society. He proposed, therefore, that the attainment of maximum profitability—profits divided by total (fixed plus working) capital—rather than the physical fulfillment of specific production tasks assigned by the planners be made the criterion of enterprise performance. Under the operation of the profit incentive, he argued, enterprises could be relied upon to search more effectively for means of improving their economic performance than under present bureaucratically determined plans.

Publication of Liberman's proposals raised a storm of discussion in the Soviet press and resulted in the proliferation of many proposals for further reforms. Other reforms proposed included adoption of such capitalist ideas as quasi-markets, with centrally established prices, to distribute output of both consumer and producer goods; overhaul of wholesale prices; interest charges on the use of fixed and working capital.

Resistance in the U.S.S.R. to the proposals—both ideological and practical—is deep rooted. To a large extent these proposals were held in abeyance by the Khrushchev leadership. Yet, the proposals are designed to provide solutions to very real economic problems of the U.S.S.R. The present system of management of resources is inefficient and wasteful. Quality of products is poor. Supply is badly organized, which results in the creation of artificial scarcities. New products and new technological processes are introduced only slowly. Planning is grossly conceived, cumbersome, and prone to costly mistakes.

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These problems are not at all new to the leadership of the U.S.S.R., since they have often been the subject of official complaints since the early 1930's. In recent years, however, they have become a matter of urgency to the extent that the rate of growth of the economy has slowed while the range of commitments has been expanding. It is this slowdown that has increased the pressure for better management of economic resources and stimulated the active quest of the new Soviet leadership for economic reform.

Kosygin's statement to the Supreme Soviet calls for the gradual extension in some form of a new production-marketing system based on Liberman's ideas, the testing of which was initiated belatedly in two garment enterprises by the Khrushchev leadership in July 1964.

The system provided for the two garment enterprises—Bol'shevichka in Moscow and Mayak in Gorki—to determine their own plans for volume, quality, and assortment of production on the basis of orders from the trade network. By the same token, they were freed from the routine of centrally allocated supply of material inputs other than capital goods.

The enterprises in the experiment are subjected to two performance criteria: first, the volume of output sold must be sufficiently large to make full use of existing production capacity; and second, the centrally established plan for profitability must be fulfilled (or overfulfilled). Decisions as to quality, amounts used, and inventories of inputs, including number of workers employed, as well as the introduction of new processing methods and new products, are left to the enterprise director to be determined on the basis of (a) orders from the trade network and (b) profitability of the work. The new system makes no provision for significant changes in the prices of the plants' products or inputs. Requests for purchases of capital goods and plant expansion continue to be subject to review by central authority. No provision is made for interest charges on fixed or working capital.

On October 20, 1964, shortly after the ouster of Khrushchev, the U.S.S.R. Sovnarkhoz announced that the new system is to be extended to enterprises accounting for one-fourth of the output of garments and footwear during 1965. Moreover, an additional test of the system was scheduled to begin January 1, 1965, in five enterprises in Lvov—including two heavy industry enterprises. Presumably the new system is to be extended, at some later date, to the remaining enterprises producing consumer goods and, eventually, to heavy industry as well.

Much work remains to be done to make the new system perform its tasks effectively. Well-known defects, such as the continued practice of central allocation of capital goods and the failure to adopt a capital charge, remain within the specific provisions of the new system. The elimination of irrational prices, upon which the system's effectiveness depends, must also be carried out. Moreover, extensive adoption of the system is likely to create difficult problems of integrating the sections using the new system with the remainder of the economy. The outlook for the next few years is for continued proposals, discussions, and controversy along with cautious experimentation with novel and un-Marxian methods of economic decision-making. Hence, no measurable improvement in the efficiency of use of resources, or in the rate of growth of the economy, can be expected from this source during the period.

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CHAPTER I

TRENDS IN SOVIET GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

SUMMARY

In 1963 Soviet GNP growth continued the declining trend evident since 1958, thus exacerbating the policy dilemma of satisfying proliferating demands on a tightening resource base. The abnormally depressed 2.6-percent increase in 1963 reflected adverse agricultural weather conditions and would have been close to 5 percent under normal circumstances. Shortfalls in agriculture compounded the shift in the production structure from commodities to the services. From 1960 to 1963 both consumption and investment experienced sharply reduced growth rates, while defense expenditures have risen dramatically. However, in 1963 and 1964 defense outlays leveled off and the new regime has reiterated its pledges to the consumer and voiced its desire to move the economy ahead at a more rapid rate.

Growth retardation can be largely explained in terms of reduced percentage increments to the labor force and to sharply reduced labor productivity increases. In the latter respect Soviet performance has been notably poor in comparison with other major economies. Worsened labor productivity performance can be in part initially explained by the reduced rate of investment, but a more important factor has been the sharply reduced rate of return on investment (higher capital-output ratios). In this respect, too, the Soviet record by international comparison has been particularly dismal. In turn, both the reduced rate of investment and its falling efficiency can be ascribed to the longer time required to assimilate the new technologies of chemicals, oil and gas, and complex machinery and to the diversion of vital scarce human and material inputs into production of sophisticated weapons.

Soviet gross national product is somewhat less than half as large as that of the United States and $2\frac{1}{2}$ times that of the major West European economies, but on a per capita basis about three-eighths as large as the United States and a third less than West Germany, France, or the United Kingdom. The U.S.S.R.-U.S. ratio has not been widened since 1961 and in absolute terms the U.S. margin has been increasing since 1958. Soviet growth through 1970 will probably average between 4.5 and 5.5 percent annually, about a percentage point above the United States, but no higher than France or Italy and much below that of Japan. Given these projections, the absolute GNP differential between the U.S.S.R. and the United States will continue to diverge. With a reduced growth rate the Soviet leadership will face a major challenge in reducing to realistic dimensions the simultaneous pursuit of increases in consumer welfare, rapid growth, and maintenance of military parity with the United States. A desire to minimize this overcommitment from a tightening resource base

could further stimulate efforts to improve the efficiency of the operation of the economy with consequent far-reaching institutional reforms.

COMPARATIVE GROWTH PERFORMANCE

The basic economic dilemma of limited resources to meet burgeoning requirements, which has plagued Soviet regimes in recent years, was particularly acute in 1963. The new leadership, as indicated by their public pronouncements and the 1965 state budget and plan, has reaffirmed this vexation. Commitments have proliferated beyond the simple Stalinist goals of rapid growth and a powerful conventional military posture to include consumer welfare, growth based on new technology, and parity with the United States in sophisticated weaponry. In contrast, the wherewithal to sustain this expanded array of priorities has worsened, both in terms of basic resource availabilities and of the efficiency with which these resources have been employed.

The long-term decline in the rate of growth of national produce which ensued after 1958 has continued through the present (table I-1).

TABLE I-1.—Annual and period growth rates of Soviet GNP¹

(Percentages)

Year	Rate	Period	Rate
1958	8.5	1950-58 average	7.0
1959	4.2	1958-63 average	4.5
1960	4.4		
1961	6.8		
1962	4.3		
1963	2.6		

¹ For derivation of component origin sector growth rates see appendix table 1, and for derivation of sector weights see appendix table 2.

NOTE.—The 1964 estimates published by the Joint Economic Committee showed a considerably lower growth rate for 1962. The revision this year is explained by recalculation of the agricultural production estimate on the basis of more comprehensive information. The higher rate is also influenced by the substitution of 1959 originating sector value added weights (see appendix, table 2) for the 1955 weights used last year. The new weights reduce the weight of agriculture and hence the depressing effect on GNP of the decline in agricultural output.

In no year since 1958 has the Soviet Union matched the annual average growth rate it achieved in the 8 years prior to that date, as indicated in table I-1. In terms of international comparisons it has slipped from a position second only to West Germany among the principal industrial powers in the period 1950-58 to an average below that of Japan, Italy, West Germany, and France during the subsequent 5 years (table I-2). Moreover, since 1961 the U.S.S.R. has also fallen behind the United States in its growth performance.

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TABLE I-2.—Comparative growth rates of gross national product
(Percentages)

Country	Annual rates						Period rates (annual averages)	
	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1950-58	1958-63
U.S.S.R.	8.5	4.2	4.9	6.6	4.3	2.6	7.0	4.5
France	2.5	2.8	7.3	4.3	6.3	4.3	4.4	5.0
Germany (Federal Republic)	3.5	7.1	8.9	5.8	4.1	3.2	7.6	5.9
Italy	4.4	7.3	6.8	8.3	6.0	4.8	5.6	6.6
United Kingdom	1.0	3.6	4.5	3.3	.2	3.5	2.4	2.0
Japan	-1	18.8	18.0	15.8	6.9	8.3	6.1	12.5
United States	-1.2	6.7	2.5	1.9	6.1	3.4	2.9	4.1

Sources: United States and Western European economies: OECD, *Statistics of National Accounts, 1950-61*, Paris, 1964. OECD, *General Statistics—National Accounts Supplement*, Paris, 1964. Statistical Office of the European Economic Communities, *General Statistical Bulletin*, No. 11, 1964. National Institute of Economic and Social Research, *National Institute Economic Review*, November 1964, London. U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, July 1964. United Nations, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, November 1964, p. 8.

Japan: Bank of Japan, *Economic Statistics of Japan, 1961*. Ministry of Finance, *Quarterly Bulletin of Financial Statistics*, 1st quarter, fiscal year 1964.

U.S.S.R.—GNP. (See appendix, table 1.)

The trend of the last 2 years in the later period is below the long-term trend as it has been heavily influenced by 2 years of unfavorable weather. If weather factors are discounted and it is assumed that the agricultural growth trend for 1958-61 would have prevailed under normal conditions, the average annual rise in GNP would have been close to 5 percent.

CHANGE IN STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION AND THE USE OF RESOURCES

The reduced pace of expansion has involved significant changes in the structure of the Soviet economy, particularly from primary, but also from secondary to tertiary production. If the 8 years prior to 1958 are contrasted with the 5 years following that year, the commodity producing sectors (primary and secondary) of the economy have exhibited sharp decelerations while the service rendering sectors (tertiary) have experienced higher growth rates (see appendix, table 1). Much of this shift can be explained by the evolution of the Soviet economy to a more advanced level, but it has been compounded by output shortfalls in agriculture with subsequent resource impacts on raw material availabilities to industry.

Agriculture has yet to attain the output level set in 1961, while the growth rate in industry has fallen from an average annual rate of 9 percent for the period 1950-58 to a rate of 7.5 percent since 1958. In construction the rate of increase has been halved as resources have been diverted away from investment and in transportation the rate is considerably less. By contrast the net outputs of the commerce and services sectors have risen at accelerated tempos since 1958. The decline in defense² and constancy in administrative services since 1958 has been more than offset by the rapid increase in educational, medical, housing, and especially scientific services.²

Available computations of official data do not permit so clear a comparison of trends in the uses of GNP, but some significant changes

² As used in the context of income originating, defense services pertain only to personnel expenditures. Other elements of defense expenditure appear in other originating sector categories. Procurement is reflected in industrial production, research and some development in scientific services, and military construction in the construction sector.

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are apparent. The retardation in growth has led to lessened increases in levels of consumption, half the rate in the period after 1958 of that experienced in the previous 8 years (table I-3). This decline is largely the result of stagnation in agricultural production with the reduction in the rate of new housing construction contributing in smaller measure. Since 1958 increases in Soviet per capita consumption levels have been considerably below those of the three principal continental economies whose consumers already enjoyed per capita consumption levels nearly twice as high as their Soviet counterparts.³ In fact, the Soviet rate of improvement has only marginally exceeded that of the United Kingdom and the United States (table I-3) while the level at per capita consumption in the United States remained between three and four times that of the U.S.S.R.⁴

TABLE I-3.—Comparative growth of consumption and investment

[Average annual rates]

Country	Consumption per capita		Fixed investment		Nonresidential investment	
	1950-58	1958-63	1950-58	1958-63	1950-58	1958-63
U.S.S.R.	5.0	2.5	10.8	7.1	12.5	8.0
France	3.3	3.8	5.5	6.5	4.5	4.6
Germany (Federal Republic)	6.3	5.7	9.6	9.3	10.0	8.7
Italy	2.1	6.4	8.2	10.3	6.2	10.3
United Kingdom	1.6	2.4	4.4	5.4	4.7	2.8
Japan ¹	2.3	7.2	7.7	19.0	(?)	(?)
United States	1.1	2.3	1.3	5.7	1.6	5.8

¹ 1953-58.² Not available.³ Sources: Market economies—See table I-2.

U.S.S.R.: Consumption (see table VIII-1); investment (see sources for construction index in table I-1).

At the same time there has been a sharp decline in the rate of growth in new capital investment. In contrast, except for West Germany where the drop was nominal, the rate of investment rose in the market economies between the two periods. There has been an actual decline in housing construction, largely the result of a sharp curtailment in private housing authorizations. In recent years the investment decline has been even more dramatic, the annual average increment for 1961-63 being only 4.7 percent for all investment and 6.7 percent if housing is excluded.

Between 1960 and 1963 defense expenditures, as measured by the imperfect indicator of the state budget, increased by more than 10.5 percent per year though in 1963 the increases has fallen to 4.7 percent. Some rough notion of the change in emphasis in military efforts is conveyed by reference to two previously cited originating sector trends. Defense services, which refer in the income originating context only to personnel expenditures, have been declining since the midfifties; while scientific services, heavily oriented to defense support, have been rising very rapidly. These two disparate trends reflect the shift in military emphasis from mass armies to the research and developmental activities essential for sophisticated weaponry.

⁴ Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, *Annual Economic Indicators for the U.S.S.R.*, 1964. Table VIII-5.

⁵ Ibid.

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FACTORS AFFECTING GROWTH RETARDATION

Economic growth may be analyzed, as in the foregoing passages, in terms of originating sectors or of uses of national product. It may also be analyzed in terms of factor inputs into the productive process. Most simply it can be expressed as the input of labor times the output per unit of labor, usually designated as labor productivity. If sufficient data is available, the labor productivity expression can be less ambiguously replaced by other productive inputs—capital, education, land, organization, and the like.

Beginning with the simplified approach, we note that part of the explanation for the retardation in growth lies in a less favorable manpower situation, the rate of increase having dropped to 1.4 from 1.9 percent in the earlier period (table I-4). This trend reflects the delayed effect of reduced wartime birth rates and the increasing difficulty of further raising an already high labor participation ratio. However, the U.S.S.R. is not conspicuous in such a trend with larger declines in West Germany, Italy, and Japan without commensurate effects on output. More striking has been the sharp deceleration in labor productivity advancement, even if cyclical weather influences are removed. In the earlier period Soviet productivity growth performance ranked at the top just below Germany's; in the later period it was much below that of Japan and the large continental powers. It moved in the opposite direction to that of all major industrialized countries, except for Germany, with a considerably smaller decline.

TABLE I-4.—Employment and labor productivity as determinants in comparative growth of GNP

(Average annual rates)

Country	1950-58			1958-63		
	GNP	Employment	Productivity ¹	GNP	Employment	Productivity ¹
U.S.S.R.	7.0	1.9	8.0	4.5	1.4	3.1
France	4.4	1.4	4.0	5.0	1.9	4.1
Germany (Federal Republic)	7.6	2.4	5.1	5.9	1.5	4.3
Italy	5.8	1.6	3.9	6.6	1.1	5.4
United Kingdom	2.4	1.4	1.9	3.0	1.5	2.5
Japan	6.1	2.1	4.0	12.5	1.3	11.1
United States	2.9	1.0	1.9	4.1	1.8	2.6

¹ Index of GNP: Index of employment expressed in man-years. No adjustment has been made for reductions in working hours. In the 2 time periods under consideration there was a larger reduction in annual hours worked in manufacturing in the U.S.S.R., 13 percent (*Narodnoe Khozaystvo SSSR v 1962 Godu*, p. 488) than in the other economies—France, 0.5; Germany, 7.8; United Kingdom, 2.5; and the United States 3.2 percent (OECD, Productivity Measurement Review, November 1962, p. 12).

² Japanese working hours rose by 3.2 percent (Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Statistical Survey of Japan, 1962*, p. 11). Therefore, in terms of man-hours Soviet productivity accomplishments are relatively understated, but a precise adjustment cannot be made in the absence of information on hours of work in nonmanufacturing occupations for most of the countries in the comparison.

Sources: GNP—See table I-2.

Employment—Market economies: OECD, *Manpower Statistics, 1950-68*. United Nations, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, November 1961.

U.S.S.R.—See table VI-2 for civilian employment and appendix table 1, services sources, for military employment.

An important factor in the decline in productivity advancement has been the cited sharp drop in the rate of growth in new capital investment (table I-3). However, the reduced investment growth rate does not suffice to explain, the productivity deceleration, as there has been

them,² respectively, for the periods 1950-55 and 1955-62,³ the effect of the shift in investment composition is to change the aggregate capital-

² While useful as a rough indicator of the efficiency of capital utilization, capital-output ratios have limitations which should be kept in mind. If so aggregative as to cover the entire economy or all of industry, their ratios may be strongly influenced by differing economic structures with differences between sectors or industrial branches often larger than those between countries. The use of marginal, rather than average, ratios may introduce distortions arising from discontinuities in investment trends. Similarly, differences in capacity utilization on terminal dates may also bias the intercountry comparisons. Even with these limitations in mind, the divergence in trends in capital-output ratios between the U.S.S.R. and the market economies has been so glaring since 1958 as to be little affected by the qualifications cited above.

³ Data on net output from Vladimir Tremel, *The 1959 Soviet Intersectoral Flow Table*, vol. I, Research Analysis Corp. (TP-137), Table 33. Data on capital stock from Tsentral'noe Staticheskoe Upravlenie, *Narodnogo Khozyaystva SSSR v 1960 Godu* (Central Statistical Administration, National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1960), p. 87.

⁴ 1961 edition of above statistical compendium, pp. 541 and 545, and 1962 edition, p. 424.

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coordinated delivery of vital inputs. The rising volume of incom-
pleted projects reflects the latter policy. Even if investment had been
given a higher resource priority, there would still have been growth
retardation resulting from the additional time required to assimilate
new technologies.

* Akademiya Nauk S.S.S.R., *Kapital'noye slozheniye i rezervy ikh ispol'zovaniya* (U.S.S.R. Academy of
Sciences, Capital Investments and Reserves for their Utilization), 1963, p. 266.

* Since 1960 rates of increase in investment have averaged only 4 percent, while explicit defense outlays
have risen by more than 10.5 percent per year (9.3 billion rubles in 1960 to 13.3 billion in 1963).

** *Economic Indicators* * * *, table IV-5 and *Pravda*, Jan. 24, 1964.

*** *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR v. 1963 Godu*, pp. 490-491.

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normal agricultural weather conditions. The projections for the market economies are based upon national target estimates for 1970 submitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and upon official Japanese plan goal (table I-7). Through 1964 the continental economies and Japan have matched or exceeded targeted growth rates. The United Kingdom has lagged in its growth performance with future recoupment dependent on the adoption and successful execution of fundamental structural reforms. If the United States can maintain the expansion pace of the past 3 years,

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output which prevailed from 1955 to 1957 before the onset of adverse weather factors. The computed upper limit has been adjusted slightly downward to reflect the continual deceleration in the rise of nonagricultural labor productivity.

Soviet growth superiority among the principal world economies is now a memory. For the remainder of this decade, Soviet growth will be little or no faster than that of France and Italy and considerably slower than that of Japan. The former wide disparity between Soviet and United States expansion rates will be reduced to around 1 percent. The absolute difference between the national products of the

¹¹ Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power*, 1962, p. 521.

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adjustment for free market sales. The relative importance of free market sales has declined significantly in recent years.

Transportation—Norman M. Kaplan, *Soviet Transport and Communications Output Indexes, 1928-62*, Rand Corp. (R31-4264-PR), 1964, p. 55. 1963 output obtained by adjusting 1963 link relative for volume of freight (table VII-2) by 1955-62 relationship between indexes of freight volume and Kaplan's computed freight output index.

Communications—Norman Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 55. 1963 index obtained by adjusting 1963 link relative for employment (SSSR v Tsifrah v 1963 Godu, p. 132) by 1955-62 relationship between index of employment and Kaplan's index of employment and revenue.

Commerce—Index moved by trend of employment in commerce, procurement, and supply (table V-A-7) times an assumed increase in productivity per worker of 0.7 percent per year. This increase in output per employee was computed for services sectors in the U.S. economy for the period 1929-61 (Victor Fuchs, *Productivity Trends in the Goods and Services Sectors, 1929-61*, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1964, p. 13). In lieu of indigenous information this trend is also presumed to apply to noncommodity sectors in the Soviet economy.

Services—Indexes for the services subsectors are based on employment trends, adjusted for the assumed 0.7 percent annual productivity increase. The defense manpower estimates are obtained from *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power*, p. 43, the column on million man-years and from Institute of Strategic Studies, *Military Balance, 1963-63* and *Military Balance, 1963-63*, London. The employment indexes for the other subsectors are obtained from table—

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1970 and 255 to 259 million by 1980. The growth rate, however, is expected to decline because as long as persons born during World War II are in the reproductive ages, the age structure of the Soviet population will serve to depress the birth rate.


PROJECTED POPULATION OF THE "ABLE-BODIED AGE"

Males aged 16 to 59 years and females aged 16 to 54 years constitute the able-bodied ages in the Soviet Union. Estimates indicate that during 1959 and 1960 the population in this age group declined by about 0.4 million and that from 1961 through 1963 the group grew less rapidly than it had prior to 1959. Thus, at the beginning

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OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, INCLUDING, FOR THE YEAR 1963, THE TERRITORY PREVIOUSLY
apply to the interwar territory adjusted for the annexations of 1939 and 1940, but exclude the population
in the territory retroceded to Poland at the end of the war.

Source: 1913-63: Tsentral'noye statisticheskoye upravleniye pri Sovete ministrov SSSR, *Narodnoye
khozaystvo SSSR v 1961 godu, statisticheskiy geshgodnik* (The National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1961, A
Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1963, pp. 7-8. 1964-65: ----- SSSR v tsifrakh v 1964 godu, *Kratkiy statis-
ticheskiy sbornik* (The U.S.S.R. in Figures in 1963, A Short Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1965, p. 7.



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U.....	214.4	429.0	100.0
D.....	258.9	248.0	95.8

¹ Census of Dec. 17, 1926.

² Census of Jan. 17, 1939.

Source: U.S.S.R.: 1913-39: Tsentral'noye statisticheskoye upravleniye pri Sovets ministroy SSSR *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1963 godu, statisticheskiy yezhegodnik* (The National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1963, A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1963, pp. 7-8. 1941: Estimate. 1950-85: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Projections of the Population of the U.S.S.R., by Age and Sex: 1964-85*, by James W. Brackett, International Population Reports, Series P-91, No. 12, Washington, 1964 p. 25. See table II-7 for an explanation of the projection series.

United States: 1913-41: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957*, Washington, 1960, p. 7. 1950 and 1964:, *Estimates of the Population of the United States, Jan. 1, 1950, to Jan. 1, 1965*, Current Population Reports, series P-25, No. 299, Washington, 1965. 1970-85:, *Projections of the Population of the United States, by Age and Sex: 1964 to 1985* by Jacob S. Siegel, Meyer Zitter, and Donald S. Akers, Current Population Reports, series P-25, No. 296, Washington, 1964, p. 41. All four series assume that mortality will decline and that there will be 300,000 im-

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23. Yerevan.....	204	309	575	607	187.0	18.0	8.0
26. Alma-Ata.....	272	446	680	607	173.4	33.1	4.7
27. Voronezh.....	344	448	535	558	62.2	24.6	4.3
28. Zaporozh'e.....	282	425	807	329	87.6	21.6	4.3
29. Krasnoyarsk.....	190	412	483	521	174.2	26.5	7.9
30. Frunze.....	93	220	326	342	267.7	55.5	4.9
31. Tallin.....	160	282	311	320	100.0	13.5	2.9
32. Dushanbe.....	83	224	276	299	259.0	33.0	8.0
33. Vil'nyus.....	215	236	271	282	31.2	19.5	4.1
34. Kishinev.....	112	216	254	267	138.4	23.6	5.1
35. Ashkhabad.....	127	176	207	215	69.3	28.5	3.9

Source: 1939, 1959, and 1963: Tsentral'noye statisticheskoye upravleniye pri Sovete ministrov SSSR, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1962 godu, statisticheskiy yezhegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1962, a Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1963, p. 25. 1964: SSSR v tsifrakh v 1963 godu, *Kratkiy statisticheskiy sbornik* (U.S.S.R. in Figures in 1963, A Short Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1964, pp. 16-17.

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Year	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050	2055	2060	2065	2070	2075	2080	2085	2090	2095	2100
1970	37.2	33.8	26.8	21.0	16.7	14.9	11.9	9.5	20.5	18.4	14.9	12.1															
1975	34.0	34.0	27.2	21.5	17.0	15.2	12.2	9.7	21.0	18.8	15.1	12.1															
1980	33.8	34.7	27.7	22.2	17.4	15.5	12.4	9.9	21.5	19.2	15.3	12.3															
1985	30.6	35.8	25.8	22.6	17.7	15.8	12.6	10.1	21.9	19.6	15.6	12.5															
1990	40.4	36.0	28.8	23.1	18.0	16.1	12.9	10.3	22.4	20.0	16.0	12.8															
1995	41.1	36.7	29.8	23.5	18.3	16.3	13.0	10.4	22.8	20.4	16.3	13.0															
2000	41.7	37.2	29.8	23.9	18.5	16.5	13.2	10.6	23.2	20.8	16.6	13.3															

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Projections of the Population of the U.S.S.R., By Age and Sex: 1964-85*, by James W. Brackett, International Population Reports, series P-91, No. 13, Washington, 1964. The assumptions used in the preparation of the projections are as follows:

Fertility: Series A: That the maternal gross reproduction rate will rise from its level of about 125 in 1963 to 130 in 1964 and will continue to rise by a constant annual amount until 1974, after which it will stabilize at 140. Series B: That the maternal gross reproduction rate will remain constant at the 1963 level throughout the projection period. Series C: That the maternal gross reproduction rate will decline to 115 in 1964 and will continue to decline by a constant annual amount until 1974, after which it will stabilize at 100. Series D: That the maternal gross reproduction rate will decline to 110 in 1964 and that it will continue to decline by a constant annual amount until 1974, after which it will stabilize at 80.

Mortality: That age-specific death rates will decline in accordance with postwar international experience.

Migration: That there will be no migration.

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* SOURCE: D. PROJECTIONS. THE FIGURES ARE BASED ON THE DATA OF THE PROJECTIONS, AND ARE NOT
 respectively.

Source: Same as table II-7.

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1968	238,756	240,263	3,014	12.5	4,717	19.6	1,703	7.1
1969	241,770	243,291	3,042	12.5	4,769	19.6	1,727	7.1
1970	244,812	246,360	2,096	12.6	4,853	19.7	1,757	7.1
1971	247,908	249,408	2,179	12.7	4,961	19.9	1,782	7.1
1972	251,087	252,720	2,265	12.9	5,078	20.1	1,813	7.2
1973	254,352	256,029	2,353	13.1	5,202	20.3	1,849	7.2
1974	257,705	259,428	2,445	13.3	5,334	20.6	1,889	7.3
1975	261,150	262,907	2,513	13.4	5,436	20.7	1,923	7.3
1976	264,063	266,450	2,574	13.4	5,542	20.8	1,968	7.4
1977	268,237	270,063	2,652	13.5	5,654	20.9	2,002	7.4
1978	271,889	273,757	2,736	13.6	5,770	21.1	2,034	7.4
1979	275,025	277,525	2,800	13.7	5,888	21.2	2,088	7.5
1980	279,425	281,361	2,871	13.8	6,008	21.3	2,127	7.6
1981	283,296	285,269	2,946	13.8	6,098	21.4	2,152	7.5
1982	287,242	290,238	3,092	13.8	6,188	21.4	2,196	7.6
1983	291,234	293,245	4,022	13.7	6,259	21.3	2,237	7.6
1984	295,256	297,274	4,036	13.6	6,313	21.2	2,277	7.7
1985	299,292							

Footnotes on p. 33.

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1972	241,000	242,000	1,310	8.4	3,107	12.8	1,797	7.4
1973	243,014	243,669	1,211	4.9	3,048	12.4	1,837	7.8
1974	244,324	244,930	1,240	8.0	3,107	12.6	1,867	7.6
1975	245,635	246,155	1,265	8.1	3,167	12.6	1,903	7.7
1976	246,775	247,408	1,285	8.2	3,231	13.0	1,946	7.8
1977	248,040	248,683	1,314	8.3	3,297	13.2	1,983	7.9
1978	249,325	249,982	1,344	8.3	3,364	13.4	2,020	8.0
1979	250,639	251,311	1,356	8.4	3,427	13.6	2,071	8.2
1980	251,983	252,661						

¹ Estimates of the total population for 1952, 1953, 1956, and 1961 through 1964 shown here are somewhat different from the official Soviet estimates for those years because the official figures imply unexplained residuals. These residuals for years 1960-62 are as follows: 1960, -34,000; 1961, +15,000; and 1962, +83,000.

² The projections were prepared prior to the release of the vital rates for 1963. The official rates for 1963 are: natural increase, 14.0; birth, 21.2; and death, 7.2. Absolute numbers of births and deaths have not yet been published.

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1965	105,053	105,858	1,610	15.2	2,365	22.3	755	7.1
1966	106,663	107,442	1,557	14.5	2,313	21.5	756	7.0
1967	108,220	108,970	1,517	13.9	2,278	20.9	761	7.0
1968	109,737	110,490	1,506	13.6	2,266	20.5	760	6.9
1969	111,243	111,998	1,510	13.5	2,274	20.3	764	6.8
1970	112,753	113,513	1,520	13.4	2,297	20.2	777	6.8
1971	114,273	115,049	1,552	13.5	2,331	20.3	779	6.8
1972	115,825	116,615	1,580	13.5	2,369	20.3	789	6.8
1973	117,405	118,211	1,611	13.6	2,409	20.4	798	6.8
1974	119,016	119,835	1,638	13.7	2,453	20.5	815	6.8
1975	120,654	121,492	1,675	13.8	2,500	20.6	823	6.8
1976	122,320	123,185	1,712	13.9	2,548	20.7	836	6.8
1977	124,041	124,916	1,747	14.0	2,600	20.8	853	6.8
1978	125,788	126,681	1,786	14.1	2,653	20.9	867	6.8
1979	127,574	128,485	1,821	14.2	2,707	21.1	886	6.9
1980	129,395	130,319	1,848	14.2	2,758	21.2	910	7.0
1981	131,243	132,184	1,882	14.2	2,804	21.2	922	7.0
1982	133,125	134,077	1,903	14.2	2,845	21.2	942	7.0
1983	135,026	135,987	1,917	14.1	2,878	21.2	961	7.1
1984	136,945	137,909	1,928	14.0	2,903	21.1	976	7.1
1985	138,873							

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1950	109,853	110,000	1,000	14.7	2,502	22.3	856	7.6
1957	111,314	112,137	1,646	14.7	2,502	22.3	814	7.2
1958	112,960	113,824	1,727	15.2	2,541	22.3	814	7.2
1959	114,087	115,348	1,722	14.9	2,533	22.1	831	7.2
1960	116,409	117,302	1,786	15.2	2,590	22.1	804	6.9
1961	118,195	119,040	1,690	14.2	2,518	21.2	828	7.0
1962	119,885	120,649	1,527	12.7	2,405	19.9	878	7.3
1963	121,412	122,132	1,480	12.1	2,360	19.3	880	7.2

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1974.....	132,474	132,872	798	8.0	1,848	12.9	1,050	7.9
1975.....	133,272	133,676	808	8.0	1,881	14.1	1,075	8.0
1976.....	134,060	134,489	818	8.1	1,920	14.3	1,102	8.2
1977.....	134,898	135,215	833	8.2	1,958	14.5	1,125	8.3
1978.....	135,731	136,158	854	8.3	1,990	14.7	1,145	8.4
1979.....	136,585	137,019	868	8.3	2,040	14.9	1,172	8.6
1980.....	137,453	137,895	884	8.4	2,078	15.1	1,194	8.7
1981.....	138,337	138,790	906	8.5	2,113	15.2	1,207	8.7
1982.....	139,243	139,700	914	8.5	2,144	15.3	1,230	8.8
1983.....	140,157	140,615	915	8.5	2,169	15.4	1,254	8.9
1984.....	141,072	141,525	905	8.4	2,187	15.5	1,252	9.1
1985.....	141,977							

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79	7.8
80	7.9
85	8.0
92	8.2
95	8.3
98	8.4
99	8.6
100	8.7
101	8.8
102	8.9
103	9.1

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C.....	22,017	22,548	22,893	23,131	23,466	24,043	24,290	24,602	24,874	24,739	24,437	23,931	23,210	22,649
D.....												23,589	22,801	21,431
10 to 14 years:												23,408	22,091	20,742
A.....														
B.....	15,298	17,441	19,291	20,628	21,610	21,934	22,467	22,611	23,047	23,382	23,952	24,211	24,589	24,809
C.....														
D.....														
15 to 19 years:														
A.....														
B.....														
C.....	10,485	14,074	12,500	11,940	13,030	15,240	17,381	19,729	20,550	21,848	21,573	22,408	22,734	22,902
D.....														
20 to 24 years:														
A.....														
B.....														
C.....	20,328	21,370	21,930	21,690	19,331	16,377	13,986	12,425	11,875	12,963	15,171	17,308	19,134	20,489
D.....														
25 to 29 years:	18,180	17,700	17,680	18,104	19,248	20,178	21,219	21,788	21,448	19,205	16,275	13,904	12,337	11,813
30 to 34 years:	18,986	19,373	19,148	18,872	18,097	18,090	17,626	17,526	18,035	19,092	20,021	21,062	21,630	21,302
35 to 39 years:	11,580	12,807	14,483	16,309	17,826	18,762	19,151	18,931	18,363	17,905	17,822	17,453	17,363	17,876
40 to 44 years:	10,398	10,178	10,468	10,158	10,585	11,409	12,624	14,279	16,080	17,584	18,517	18,908	18,692	18,140
45 to 49 years:	12,234	12,030	11,593	11,039	10,531	10,188	9,975	9,860	9,964	10,380	11,295	12,404	14,035	15,809
50 to 54 years:	10,437	10,797	11,229	11,941	11,882	11,882	11,672	11,247	10,714	10,229	9,901	9,703	9,605	9,703
55 to 59 years:	8,604	8,961	9,194	9,415	9,644	9,967	10,319	10,737	11,133	11,373	11,378	11,180	10,770	10,272
60 to 64 years:	6,692	6,968	7,265	7,560	7,861	8,134	8,383	8,604	8,810	9,050	9,341	9,674	10,074	10,451
65 to 69 years:	5,037	5,190	5,374	5,581	5,803	6,043	6,298	6,565	6,849	7,120	7,370	7,604	7,803	7,991
70 to 74 years:	3,805	3,917	4,011	4,102	4,189	4,283	4,421	4,578	4,750	4,950	5,161	5,381	5,617	5,865
75 years and over:	4,163	4,353	4,537	4,765	4,976	5,197	5,390	5,591	5,786	5,988	6,203	6,430	6,670	6,923

INDICATORS FOR THE U.S.A.

65 to 69 years.....	8,210	8,473	8,782	9,131	9,497	9,808	10,119	10,501	10,811	11,187	11,497	11,858	12,014
70 to 74 years.....	6,101	6,321	6,523	6,692	6,852	7,040	7,270	7,536	7,856	8,160	8,341	8,349	8,201
75 years and over.....	7,195	7,484	7,792	8,119	8,461	8,805	9,148	9,489	9,817	10,150	10,507	10,896	11,312

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A														
B														
C	7,749	8,841	9,784	10,469	10,974	11,146	11,423	11,610	11,741	11,923	12,233	12,378	12,588	12,712
D														
15 to 19 years:														
A														
B	8,372	7,078	6,302	6,034	6,596	7,720	8,812	9,754	10,439	10,944	11,116	11,393	11,680	11,711
C														
D														
20 to 24 years:														
A														
B	10,049	10,592	10,900	10,756	9,651	8,201	7,022	6,254	5,997	6,559	7,679	8,767	9,707	10,390
C														
D														
25 to 29 years:	8,912	8,764	8,728	8,974	9,486	9,947	10,490	10,798	10,836	9,566	8,133	6,967	6,211	5,936
30 to 34 years:	8,606	8,932	8,976	8,846	8,743	8,703	8,652	8,619	8,866	9,390	9,641	10,382	10,688	10,554
35 to 39 years:	4,823	5,166	6,054	7,037	7,896	8,465	8,791	8,837	8,712	8,620	8,674	8,642	8,515	8,763
40 to 44 years:	3,993	3,884	3,807	3,820	4,013	4,430	5,064	5,638	6,905	7,743	8,320	8,643	8,699	8,673
45 to 49 years:	4,701	4,599	4,428	4,217	4,018	3,874	3,771	3,697	3,713	3,903	4,315	4,940	5,797	6,745
50 to 54 years:	4,003	4,167	4,325	4,455	4,515	4,492	4,399	4,235	4,038	3,852	3,718	3,624	3,563	3,574
55 to 59 years:	2,908	3,042	3,210	3,394	3,574	3,741	3,898	4,049	4,171	4,234	4,215	4,131	3,982	3,798
60 to 64 years:	2,344	2,392	2,426	2,464	2,524	2,621	2,746	2,902	3,072	3,242	3,400	3,546	3,688	3,804
65 to 69 years:	1,751	1,803	1,865	1,928	1,993	2,032	2,074	2,103	2,141	2,196	2,282	2,396	2,434	2,687
70 to 74 years:	1,273	1,301	1,330	1,359	1,386	1,415	1,404	1,514	1,567	1,614	1,636	1,689	1,715	1,746
75 years and over:	1,267	1,324	1,383	1,448	1,512	1,579	1,633	1,690	1,748	1,808	1,870	1,938	2,008	2,077

65 to 69 years.....	8,004	8,550	8,770	8,641	8,479	8,326	8,218	8,144	8,090	8,111	8,283	8,645	4,187
70 to 74 years.....	2,839	2,980	3,111	3,230	3,342	3,397	3,388	3,323	3,207	3,065	2,935	2,842	2,781
75 to 79 years.....	1,703	1,869	1,906	2,081	2,209	2,336	2,463	2,661	2,668	2,766	2,801	2,794	2,741
80 years and over.....	2,147	2,212	2,276	2,338	2,403	2,480	2,576	2,683	2,800	2,927	3,060	3,107	3,327

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10 to 14 years:														
A														
B														
C	7,549	8,600	9,507	10,183	10,636	10,788	11,042	11,201	11,308	11,457	11,729	11,833	12,001	12,097
D														
15 to 19 years:														
A														
B														
C	8,213	9,090	9,108	9,906	10,434	10,520	10,569	10,475	10,127	10,604	10,757	11,013	11,174	11,281
D														
20 to 24 years:														
A														
B														
C	10,779	10,778	11,039	10,840	9,680	8,176	6,964	6,109	5,878	6,406	7,492	8,541	9,447	10,099
D														
25 to 29 years	9,268	9,028	8,958	9,220	9,782	10,229	10,729	10,990	10,792	9,639	8,143	6,937	6,144	5,637
30 to 34 years	10,380	10,441	10,173	9,728	9,354	9,213	8,974	8,907	9,109	9,712	10,180	10,680	10,942	10,749
35 to 39 years	7,057	7,641	8,420	9,272	9,940	10,297	10,390	10,094	9,652	9,265	9,148	8,913	8,848	9,113
40 to 44 years	6,405	6,292	6,250	6,338	6,572	6,979	7,560	8,341	9,175	9,839	10,107	10,263	10,003	9,587
45 to 49 years	7,653	7,431	7,185	6,822	6,513	6,314	6,204	6,172	6,251	6,494	6,800	7,464	8,238	9,064
50 to 54 years	6,432	6,630	6,904	7,189	7,367	7,390	7,273	7,012	6,676	6,377	6,183	6,079	6,050	6,129
55 to 59 years	5,788	5,919	5,984	6,021	6,090	6,220	6,421	6,688	6,962	7,139	7,183	7,049	6,707	6,474
60 to 64 years	4,344	4,570	4,830	5,105	5,347	5,513	5,639	5,702	5,739	5,809	5,841	5,828	5,786	5,741
65 to 69 years	3,296	3,385	3,500	3,653	3,820	4,011	4,224	4,463	4,719	4,924	5,088	5,208	5,292	5,361
70 to 74 years	2,512	2,616	2,684	2,743	2,803	2,870	2,957	3,064	3,189	3,320	3,465	3,622	3,802	4,119
75 years and over	2,898	3,031	3,172	3,317	3,464	3,618	3,783	3,961	4,159	4,380	4,623	4,894	5,204	5,546

INDICATORS FOR THE U.S.R.

Source: Same as table II-7.

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in 1960 and in 1963.

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